Birmingham (UK), 8-9 May 2014
10:30-11:30 – Ryan McKay (Royal Holloway) and Maarten Boudry (University of Ghent): “In Defence of False Beliefs?”
11:40-12:40 – Lisa Bortolotti (University of Birmingham): “Epistemic Costs and Benefits of Delusional Beliefs”.
14:00-15:00 – Katerina Fotopoulou (University College London): “Inferring the Self: Neurological Exaggerations of Normally Imperfect Inferences about the Body”
15:00-16:00 – Martin Conway (City University London): “Memory, Reality, and Consciousness in the Remembering-Imaging System”
16:30-17:30 – Ema Sullivan-Bissett (University of Birmingham): “The Epistemic Status of Confabulatory Explanations”
9:30-10:30 – Petter Johansson and Lars Hall (University of Lund): “Choice Blindness and the Flexibility of Attitude Formation: Why not Knowing why might be a Good Thing”
11:00-12:00 – Jules Holroyd (University of Nottingham): “Implicit Bias, Awareness Conditions, and Epistemic Innocence”
12:00-13:00 – Miranda Fricker (University of Sheffield): “Fault and No-fault Epistemic Responsibility for Implicit Prejudice”
If you are interested in attending this workshop, please contact Ema Sullivan-Bissett (e.l.sullivan-bissett AT bham.ac.uk) to inquire about availability.
In Filosofisk Supplement, the undergraduate philosophy journal at the University of Oslo.
A reader of the Brains blog wrote me the other day concerning a referee report he’d received on a submission to a top “generalist” journal. (See here if you don’t understand the rationale for my punctuation practices.)
Despite praising the article overall and saying that it probably warranted publication, the referee advised rejection, partly on the ground that the author’s argument was too heavily reliant on “contentious (somewhat empirical) theories which belong to cognitive science as much as to philosophy of mind”. According to the referee, whereas the kind of detailed defense of these theories required for a generalist philosophical audience would have made the paper too long, the only place where it would be appropriate to “just acknowledge the reliance and get on with it” would be in a specialist journal like Philosophical Psychology or the Journal of Consciousness Studies.
Yale just created a new program in which graduate students can get a single degree that counts as a PhD in both philosophy and psychology. The basic idea is that students take courses in both departments and then write a single interdisciplinary dissertation. On completing the degree, students should be in a good position to apply for jobs in either field.
This has the potential to be a pretty amazing opportunity, so be sure to get out the word to interested students
The Marc Sanders Prize in Philosophy of Mind is an annual essay competition open to scholars who are within fifteen (15) years of receiving a Ph.D. and students who are currently enrolled in a graduate program. Independent scholars may also be eligible and should direct inquiries to David Sosa, editor of Analytic Philosophy at email@example.com.
The award for the prizewinning essay is $8,000. Winning essays will be published in Analytic Philosophy. Continue Reading →
Many thanks to those who have participated in the Butterfill and Apperly symposium, which will remain open for at least a few more days.
Blogging at Brains will likely get quiet over the holidays, but I’m pleased to say that beginning next week, Oron Shagrir of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem will blog about his co-edited volume (with B. Jack Copeland and Carl J. Posey) Computability: Turing, Gödel, Church, and Beyond, recently published by the MIT Press.
I hope also to have something to announce something very soon about our next Mind & Language symposium, as well as some developments in the overall editorial structure of the Brains blog.
Submission deadline: Saturday, February 1 2014 EST
Conference date(s): Saturday, April 12 2014 EST
Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University
Washington, United States
“But, oh, to get involved in the exchange / Of human emotions / Is ever so, ever so satisfying.” – Bjork, “Human Behaviour”
After decades of neglect, the philosophical study of emotion and related phenomena has witnessed something of a resurgence in the last fifty years. Continue Reading →
Self and Agency: Phenomenological Approaches
8th Annual Research Seminar in Phenomenology 2014
Tuesday, April 22 2014 CET – Friday, April 25 2014 CET
University of Liège
Presentation: This year the topic of the seminar is the relationship between the self and agency. Continue Reading →
My paper with Edward Cokely entitled “Predicting Philosophical Disagreement” is now out in Philosophy Compass. It puts in one accessible piece the work we’ve done over the past several years showing that heritable personality traits predict disagreement in a number of philosophical domains, even among verifiable experts. In the article we argue that:
- Some philosophical intuitions are likely caused by personality. These relations can legitimately help illuminate philosophical debates but naïve approaches have led to serious conceptual errors,
- Ignoring individual differences in philosophical intuitions is philosophically and scientifically irresponsible
This body of research provides one of the most compelling cases for the necessity of experimental philosophy. Continue Reading →