Brains


On Philosophy of Mind and Related Matters
Brains

Budapest Semester in Cognitive Science

If you have undergraduate students looking for an interesting study abroad experience that will keep them on track in their philosophy, psychology, computer science, or cognitive science major, please point them towards the Budapest Semester in Cognitive Science (http://www.bscs-us.org/).

It is a really good program, and has had regular participation from scholars doing interesting research in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, such as Colin Allen, John Bickle, Ron Chrisley, Carl Craver, Peter Erdi, and George Kampis.

The official program announcement is below.  If you or your students have any questions about the program, please contact me (tony.chemero@fandm.edu) or the program office at bscs@bscs-us.org.

Cheers,

Tony Chemero

US Director of BSCS

——

The BUDAPEST SEMESTER IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE (BSCS, website: www.bscs-us.org), our Hungarian study abroad program that may be of interest to undergraduate students in Cognitive Science and other disciplines.

BSCS, established in 2003 focuses on cognitive science from an interdisciplinary perspective and offers credit-earning courses in neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, linguistics, biology, and computer science; as well as continuous and optional intensive Hungarian language courses. The program is complemented by an optional independent research module tailored to students' curricula and research interests.

BSCS is hosted by the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at Eotvos Lorand University (ELTE), Hungary's premium science university established in 1635 and serving as a centre of excellence for modern higher education. A world-class new campus has been added to the premises of ELTE, built on the scenic banks of the Danube and hosting the Faculties of Natural and Social Sciences and Informatics, where BSCS courses are held.

Budapest provides an excellent and highly inspiring setting and our vibrant metropolis is a hub of a wide range of interdisciplinary studies and research; boasting a bustling Central European experience with a growing English-speaking academic community. Furthermore, the city serves as a gateway to Vienna, Prague and other major attractions of the region.

The application deadline for the Fall 2012 semester is April 15.

Visit our website for more detailed information (www.bscs-us.org).  Email inquiries to bscs@bscs-us.org, or to Tony Chemero, US Director, tony.chemero@fandm.edu.

successful vs. unsuccessful psychopaths

Bill Hirstein and I have just submitted a paper to the SPP on the criminal culpability of successful vs. unsuccessful psychopaths, and I'm hoping to generate a bit of discussion on the distinction.

Gao and Raine recently published a review of studies distinguishing the two populations within five types of samples: a community recruited sample, individuals from temporary employment agencies, college students, psychopaths employed in business and industry, and psychopathic serial killers (Gao and Raine 2010). Studies suggest that unsuccessful psychopaths have reduced prefrontal and amygdala volumes and hippocampal abnormalities, resulting in reduced executive functioning, including impaired decision-making. Unsuccessful psychopaths also exhibit impaired autonomic/somatic markers and fear-conditioning deficits which contribute to poor and risky decision-making. In contrast, successful psychopaths do not show similar structural and functional impairments of the prefrontal cortex, amygdala and hippocampus. They seem to have intact autonomic function and possibly enhanced executive functioning when compared with normals. Gao and Raine hypothesize that successful psychopaths may have superior cognitive empathy (the ability to understand another’s perspective) without emotional empathy (feeling empathetic emotions).

Our hypothesis is that unsuccessful
psychopaths’ deficiencies in executive processing may be severe enough to constitute evidence of diminished mental capacity. Many successful psychopaths, on the other hand, seem to have a healthy enough executive profile to correct for their lack of emotional empathy. In philosophical terms, they could have done otherwise
. Like a colorblind driver, or a high-functioning autistic person, successful psychopaths would seem to have the ability to take note of their emotional/cognitive lack and make up for it so as to avoid violating the law. If an offender is capable of (knowingly) following a law, she is responsible when she does not.

I'd be happy to hear any comments on this line of thought, and to pass along the whole paper to anyone interested.

Templeton Foundation Open Submission--Starting Soon!

As part of its spring open submission cycle, the John Templeton Foundation welcomes online funding inquiries in the areas of philosophy and theology.  The submission window is February 1 to April 16, 2012.  Proposed philosophical projects need not have religion or theology as a focus.  To submit an online funding inquiry, please visit www.templeton.org/what-we-fund/our-grantmaking-process.  

Please note that the Templeton Foundation does not normally provide dissertation fellowships through this open submission process.  For more information on the kinds of projects that the Foundation can support, visit www.templeton.org/what-we-fund/core-funding-areas/science-and-the-big-questions.

A list of Foundation grants in the areas of philosophy and theology can be found here: http://www.templeton.org/what-we-fund/grant-search/results/taxonomy:5.

CO4 Program

The program for the 4th Online Consciousness Conference is coming together nicely and is nearly finalized. Check it out! The Conference is scheduled for February 17th-March 2nd. Papers will be available online one week before the conference begins. Mark your calendars and spread the word!!

Greetings

Gualtiero kindly gave me an account here, so I am left with the problem of what to post.  A brief introduction.  I have a background in analytic philosophy, first in the philosophy of perception, mostly studying nineteenth century theories of perception and consciousness, and then in philosophy of language, focusing particularly on medieval theories of language, and to some extent medieval theories of intentionality and consciousness.  I recently completed a translation of an early work by Duns Scotus with Jack Zupko of Winnipeg university.

I am not sure what the medieval word for 'consciousness' would be.  They wrote in Latin, and the word 'conscious' derives from the Latin 'conscio', which does mean to be conscious, but in the general sense of joint knowledge, being privy to some fact etc.  It is closely related to 'conscientia', which means something like our word 'conscience'.  Augustine says Nulla enim definitionum illarum timenda est, cum bene sibi conscius est animus, using the word 'conscius', but what he probably means by 'bene sibi conscius est animus' is that the soul (or mind) has a good conscience.  This reminds me of the distinction between 'mind' and 'soul' which the scholastic philosophers were careful to draw, and I wonder if the modern 'consciousness' means something like what they meant by 'soul'.  We tend to avoid 'soul', of course, perhaps because of the religious implications.

The medievals also frequently used the word 'intellectus' which translates loosely as 'understanding', but can also be translated as 'concept' or 'conception'.  

Anyway, enough rambling. To bring me up to date from the medieval period and the early nineteenth century where I got stuck, could the readers of this blog give me a few signposts about some very general questions.  What are the current 'canonical problems' in the philosophy of mind?  Who are the main writers in this area?  Do we distinguish the philosophy of mind from sciences like pychology, psychiatry, neuroscience and so on?

Edward

Philosophers' Carnival

Here.

Women Working in the Philosophy of Mind

Inspired by Trent Dougherty's efforts at Certain Doubts to compile a list of women working in epistemology, Carolyn, Brit, and I have spent some time doing the same for the philosophy of mind. Let me quote Trent's justification for such a project:

I suspect that one of the most common sources of women being under-represented (even at a rate lower than their under-representation in the field) at conferences and in edited volumes (full disclosure: one of my three edited volume projects has no women in it) is the “comes to mind” bias.  One way to counteract this is to “double check.”  But that will not be equally easy for everyone and may have pitfalls of its own.

In light of this, clearly some sort of "master list" can be a very valuable resource. Our initial attempt at making such a list is available at the link below. Please note that this is only a first draft, and we are sure it is error-ridden and has left off far too many people, so please suggest additions and corrections over e-mail or in the comments to this post. I will update the file periodically. Thanks!

New Contributors Welcome

Thanks to its ever growing community of contributors, Brains's traffic has increased to about 150-300 unique visitors per day.  As I said before, Brains is a service to the community of scholars interested in the philosophy of mind and related sciences.  Anyone who belongs in this community and would like to contribute to Brains is welcome to contact me.

CFP: Consciousness and Moral Cognition

Mark Phelan (Lawrence) and Adam Waytz (Northwestern) are guest editing a special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology on consciousness attribution in moral cognition. Guest authors include: Kurt Gray (Maryland), Edouard Machery (Pittsburgh) and Justin Sytsma (East Tennessee State), and  Anthony I. Jack (Case Western Reserve) and Philip Robbins (Missouri). 

Submissions are due March 31, 2011.

The full CFP, including relevant dates and submission details, is available here

Here is an abbreviated CFP:  When people regard other entities as objects of ethical concern whose interests must be taken into account in moral deliberations, does the attribution of consciousness to these entities play an essential role in the process? In recent years, philosophers and psychologists have begun to sketch limited answers to this general question. However, much progress remains to be made. We invite contributions to a special issue of The Review of Philosophy and Psychology on the role of consciousness attribution in moral cognition from researchers working in fields including developmental, evolutionary, perceptual, and social psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and philosophy.

Consciousness and Moral Cognition

The Review of  Philosophy and Psychology has just released a call for papers for a special issue on Consciousness and Moral Cognition. 

In essence, the editors are interested in questions about how people's attributions of consciousness affect their moral judgments. Do people think that they have a greater obligation to creatures that have phenomenal consciousness than they do to creatures that only have non-phenomenal mental states? 

Just in the past few years, there have been a couple of really exciting empirical papers on this topic. The psychologists Kurt Gray, Liane Young and Adam Waytz have a pretty amazing paper arguing that part of the very essence of moral judgment is an ability to see the victim as being capable of a certain kind of experience. But then again, Adam Arico, Brian Fiala, Rob Goldberg and Shaun Nichols have suggested that people ascribe consciousness using the very same process they use to ascribe any other psychological state, and Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery have claimed that ordinary people don't even have the notion of phenomenal consciousness. 

Regardless of whether you have read any of these earlier papers, I'm just curious to hear what you think about these issues. Do ascriptions of consciousness actually play any special role in moral judgment? What do you think?


Recent Posts

  1. Budapest Semester in Cognitive Science
    Thursday, January 26, 2012
  2. successful vs. unsuccessful psychopaths
    Wednesday, January 25, 2012
  3. Templeton Foundation Open Submission--Starting Soon!
    Wednesday, January 25, 2012
  4. CO4 Program
    Tuesday, January 17, 2012
  5. Greetings
    Sunday, January 15, 2012
  6. Philosophers' Carnival
    Monday, January 09, 2012
  7. Women Working in the Philosophy of Mind
    Monday, January 09, 2012
  8. New Contributors Welcome
    Tuesday, January 03, 2012
  9. CFP: Consciousness and Moral Cognition
    Tuesday, December 27, 2011
  10. Consciousness and Moral Cognition
    Monday, December 26, 2011

Recent Comments

  1. gualtiero piccinini on Templeton Foundation Open Submission--Starting Soon!
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  2. Daniel Weiskopf on Templeton Foundation Open Submission--Starting Soon!
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  3. John Gregg on Greetings
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  4. Anonymous on Women Working in the Philosophy of Mind
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  6. Matthew Arnatt on Millianism and the Metaphysics of Propositions
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  7. Carrie Figdor on Women Working in the Philosophy of Mind
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