Congratulations are due …

Heartfelt congratulations to Felipe De Brigard (Duke University), winner of the 2017 Stanton Prize from the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, and Andrea Scarantino (Georgia State University), winner of the 2017 Simon Prize from the International Association for Computing and Philosophy.

Felipe will give his prize address at the SPP’s upcoming meeting at Johns Hopkins University, and Andrea his at the IACAP’s meeting at Stanford. Both meetings are still accepting submissions …

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Call For Papers: 3rd Annual Minds Online Conference

The editors of the Brains blog, together with the Departments of Philosophy at Florida State University and the University of Houston, are pleased to announce that the third annual Minds Online conference will be held during the month of September, 2017. And we hope that you’ll submit, participate, and share this with interested philosophers and cognitive scientists. Keynotes …

Quietism, Naive Realism, and the Nature of Philosophy

One of the reasons why philosophical discussions of colour are interesting and important is that they bear on a number of wider philosophical questions. In today’s post I want to introduce some meta-philosophical questions about the nature of philosophical inquiry that philosophical discussions of colour help to bring into focus. …

Colours as Observational Properties

The second main claim made by the naïve realist is that colours are distinct from the physical properties of objects. In saying that colours are distinct from the physical properties of objects, the naïve realist is not necessarily saying that are ‘perfectly simple’ properties whose nature cannot be described further; …

Colour Constancy and the Mind-Independence of Colour

According to the naïve realist, colours are mind-independent properties of objects that are distinct from their physical properties. In today’s post I outline the argument for the first part of the view: the claim that colours are mind-independent. To say that colours are mind-independent properties is to say that their …

CFP: Workshop on imagination and mental imagery in epistemology

March 16, 2017 University of Antwerp Confirmed speakers: Dominic Gregory (Sheffield) Francesco Berto (Amsterdam) Lu Teng (Antwerp) Shannon Spaulding (Oklahoma State University) Some slots are reserved for contributed papers. There are no parallel sections. Only blinded submissions are accepted. Length: 3000 words. Single spaced! Deadline: February 1, 2017. Papers should …

Morality, the Problem of Possible Future Selves, and Christmas Parables

In my 2016 book, Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory, I argue that morality is a solution to a problem of diachronic rationality called ‘the problem of possible future selves.’ To simplify (very) greatly, the problem–which is partially inspired by L.A. Paul’s groundbreaking work on transformative experience–is that (A) our present …

First-Personal Self-Knowledge

The extent and interest of third-personal self-knowledge notwithstanding, first-personal self-knowledge too deserves attention. In The Varieties of Self-Knowledge three chapters are devoted to a critique of contemporary accounts of it. In particular, I consider Armstrong’s reliabilist model, Peacocke’s and Burge’s different kinds of rationalism, Evans’s transparency method and its two …

The Varieties of Self-Knowledge

Despite their differences, all previously reviewed accounts have something in common. That is, they adhere to monism with respect to self-knowledge. What they all do is focus on one specific instance, provide what seems at least a prima facie suitable explanation and then try to generalize it to all other …