Teaching the philosophy of cognitive science
This entry was posted on 8/4/2006 7:01 AM and is filed under Cognition.
I am getting ready for my Fall graduate seminar at Pitt—Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science. The class is a survey of the main issues in the current philosophy of cognitive science (broadly conceived). To my own surprise, it has become clear that the class I will teach will be very different from the class I would have taught a few years ago or from the class I would have taken when I was a graduate student.
Many topics, that were very controversial at the end of the 90s, have become more marginal, if not disappeared altogether (unfortunately or not). Among the victims:
- connectionism vs. language of thought
- content
- the individuation of concepts (e.g., the debate between Fodor and Peacocke)
- compositionality
At the last SPP, I noticed that these topics were entirely absent.
Have other topics become marginal? And, most interesting, what are the controverisal topics that any student interested in the philosophy of cog science/psychology/neuropsychology should be familiar with?