Functionalism and Properties
This entry was posted on 9/15/2006 9:35 AM and is filed under Metaphysics.
John Heil has been arguing for a while (cf. his book From an Ontological Point of View, OUP, 2003) that an important source of problems in the metaphysics of mind (e.g., about mental causation) is the tacit though widespread endorsement of the following principle [I am simplifying Heil's formulations a bit]:
(P) Every non-empty predicate refers to a property.
Heil thinks that instead of (P), we should endorse the following weaker principle:
(P*) Every non-empty predicate applies to objects in virtue of the objects' properties.
Heil's point is that under (P*), we don't need to suppose that there are higher levels of being (i.e., higher level properties). And without higher levels of being, we don't run into the problems of mental causation that, e.g., Kim's career has been built on.
I just read a recent paper in which Heil accuses Putnam of tacitly endorsing (P) in his influential formulation of functionalism, contributing to its acceptance among philosophers and with it, to the problems that it generates. Heil's paper ("Functionalism, Realism and Levels of Being" in the volume on Putnam edited by Conant and Zeglenis) is followed by a baffling response by Putnam:
"I did not accept your (P) in my arguments, but I do want to defend it. One reason for accepting it is that all of its instances are theorems of what I think of as the only good formal theory of properties (i.e., of predicates in intension) that I know, namely Russell's Principia Mathematica or 'ramified type theory' minus the Axiom of Reducibility" (Putnam 2002, p. 143).
What baffles me the most is Putnam's qualification that properties are predicates in intension. Well, if properties just ARE predicates in intension, then (P) is not only true, it is analytic. If so, what is the point of invoking Russell's theory? By presupposing that there is no distinction between properties and predicates, Putnam is not so much arguing against Heil as refusing to engage with him.
I asked Heil if I was missing something, and he said I am not. He added that he presented the paper at a small conference on Putnam that took place in Poland. In person, Putnam seemed to like much of what Heil said. But in his written reply, Putnam is less clear. It is hard to see how the position as he now describes it connects with the current debate about mental properties and their causal relevance.
Heil added a philosophically interesting anecdote. At that meeting, there seemed to be two groups of philosophers. One thought (P) is obviously false, to the point that no one could possibly accept it. The other group thought (P) is obviously true, to the point that it would be crazy to doubt it. As to Putnam, he seemed to be in both camps.
Any takes on (P)?
