This is the fourth in a series of posts about my recently published book, Forming Impressions: Expertise in Perception and Intuition (OUP, 2020). Intuition in Philosophy Let’s call the following picture of philosophy the Standard Picture. [A] Philosophers make judgments about knowledge, freedom, wrongness, etc. based on intuitions about knowledge, …
This is the third in a series of posts about my recently published book, Forming Impressions: Expertise in Perception and Intuition (OUP, 2020). Presentational Conservatism Part 2 of Forming Impressions develops an epistemology of experiences that manifest expertise. My approach is first to discuss the epistemology of experience in general, …
This is the second in a series of posts about my recently published book, Forming Impressions: Expertise in Perception and Intuition (OUP, 2020). Birds and Physics Problems In Chapters 2 and 3 of Forming Impressions, I argue that both expert perception and expert intuition manifest themselves in experience. When an …
Introduction Radiologists can reliably tell whether a seen x-ray image is abnormal without scanning its details. This is an example of expert perception. Chess masters immediately think of superior moves, so that the move they ultimately choose differs from these initial options only in difficult cases. This is an example …
I will conclude this series of posts by saying something about why I think cognitive phenomenology is significant. The basic idea is that phenomenology in general is connected to epistemology, value theory, and semantics via the notion of awareness, and cognitive phenomenology in particular is connected to these areas via …
According to Mill “pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends.” This does not imply that the good life is a degrading one, fit for swine, however, at least partly because there are “pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral …
According to William James experiences, including conscious thoughts, flow in a stream of consciousness. Peter Geach argued that whatever we say about other experiences, conscious thoughts at least do not flow, but rather occur in discrete sequences. A number of recent arguments against cognitive phenomenology take Geach’s criticisms of James …
