When I started work on The Shared World, the innocent plan was to write a straightforward philosophical treatment of joint attention. But it became apparent soon enough that a comprehensive account of the topic required thinking about so much else – demonstrative reference, communication in both its bodily and linguistic forms, …
We act in an environment in which much is in public view, and you might very well think that perceptual facts that cannot be known in common cannot be known at all. For any account that aims to explain the public character of our perceptual surroundings, the notion of common …
“One cannot not communicate”: this slightly unsettling axiom of Watzlawick’s (1967) is necessarily true of creatures operating in social space. The social spatial framework is not simply given to but achieved by us through activities in which demonstrative gestures play a vital role. We point, nudge, and direct others’ gaze towards …
Consider the spatial arrangement that has to be in place if a creature is to act in its environment. One requirement is that the creature operate with an egocentric spatial framework – that it be able to determine the location of objects relative to its own position in space (Evans 1982). …
Many thanks to John Schwenkler for giving me the opportunity to write about The Shared World (MIT Press 2019). A question that has long fascinated me is how perceivers and agents can be operating in an environment that is public or, as I also say, shared; a world in which …
