CFA: The Rational Role of Cognitive Phenomenology

Call for Abstracts, Workshop: The Rational Role of Cognitive Phenomenology University of Bergen, June 6–7th, 2017. Extended deadline for submissions: February 26th, 2017 Travel and accommodation funding is available. The organisers encourage participation from members of under-represented groups. Please scroll down for further information. DESCRIPTION Previous orthodoxy in philosophy of …

CFP: Workshop on imagination and mental imagery in epistemology

March 16, 2017 University of Antwerp Confirmed speakers: Dominic Gregory (Sheffield) Francesco Berto (Amsterdam) Lu Teng (Antwerp) Shannon Spaulding (Oklahoma State University) Some slots are reserved for contributed papers. There are no parallel sections. Only blinded submissions are accepted. Length: 3000 words. Single spaced! Deadline: February 1, 2017. Papers should …

Stereotyping, Rationality, & the Cognitive Architecture of Virtue

Alex Madva Cal Poly Pomona alexmadva.com Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008, 2011), and subsequently Andy Egan (2011), have argued that implicit biases pit our moral and epistemic aims against each other.  They cite research suggesting that the strength of implicit biases correlates with the knowledge individuals have of prevalent stereotypes, even …

Factive verbs and factive mental states

My last post went back to babies, to see if the dawn of mental state attribution might show us something about the relationship between knowledge and belief.  Even for those who take the concept of belief to be innate or very early-developing, belief attribution is weirdly dependent on knowledge attribution …

Yes, We Can: Get from the State View to the Content View

In my previous post, I referred several times to the state view/content view distinction. As has been argued by authors such as Byrne (2005) or Crowther (2006), the distinction is problematic for nonconceptualists to the extent that they want to make a claim about perceptual content. For central pro-nonconceptualist arguments …

Introducing Modest Nonconceptualism

First off, I want to thank John Schwenkler for inviting me to contribute a few posts on my new book, Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, Content, this week. As I’m sure readers of the Brains blog are well aware, there is an intricate debate over whether perceptual experience is conceptual or …

#MindsOnline2015, Session 3: Belief and Reasoning

The third session of the Minds Online conference has begun! It is on the theme of Belief and Reasoning, and includes the following papers: Ram Neta (UNC) “Basing Is Conjuring” (KEYNOTE) Grace Helton (University of Antwerp): “The Revisability View of Belief” Commentators: Michael Bishop and Neil Van Leeuwen Jack Marley-Payne (MIT): “Against Intellectualist Theories of …

Cognitive Phenomenology: Why Bother?

I will conclude this series of posts by saying something about why I think cognitive phenomenology is significant. The basic idea is that phenomenology in general is connected to epistemology, value theory, and semantics via the notion of awareness, and cognitive phenomenology in particular is connected to these areas via …