Symposium on Alex Madva’s “A Plea for Anti-Anti-Individualism”

It’s my pleasure to introduce our third Ergo symposium, featuring Alex Madva’s “A Plea for Anti-Anti-Individualism: How Oversimple Psychology Misleads Social Policy” with commentaries by Saray Ayala-Lopez (California State University, Sacramento), Sally Haslanger (MIT), and Jennifer Saul (University of Sheffield). I’d like to thank each of the participants for their great …

CFA: Psychological and Structural Explanations of Injustice

CFA—BIAS IN CONTEXT #4: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS OF INJUSTICE University of Utah, Salt Lake City October 12 – 13 2017 ***DEADLINE FOR ABSTRACTS, May 15*** Conference Website: http://biasincontext4.weebly.com/ THEME: What is the relationship between psychological and structural explanations of persistent social injustice? This conference—the final in a series of …

Morality, the Problem of Possible Future Selves, and Christmas Parables

In my 2016 book, Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory, I argue that morality is a solution to a problem of diachronic rationality called ‘the problem of possible future selves.’ To simplify (very) greatly, the problem–which is partially inspired by L.A. Paul’s groundbreaking work on transformative experience–is that (A) our present …

CFP: Themes in Transformative Experience

Themes in Transformative Experience: metaphysics, aesthetics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind Pre conference of the 2017 Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association Seattle, WA April 11th, 2017 The Seattle Westin Transformative experience connects to a wide range of philosophical topics. An experience can be epistemically transformative by teaching …

Three Studies That No Moral Philosopher Should Ignore

Robin Zheng Newnham College University of Cambridge In my chapter, I argue that for cases of implicitly biased action, we should set aside questions of responsibility as attributability in favor of responsibility as accountability. As I interpret the distinction, the former constitute a problem in metaphysics and philosophy of action because we are …

Stereotyping, Rationality, & the Cognitive Architecture of Virtue

Alex Madva Cal Poly Pomona alexmadva.com Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008, 2011), and subsequently Andy Egan (2011), have argued that implicit biases pit our moral and epistemic aims against each other.  They cite research suggesting that the strength of implicit biases correlates with the knowledge individuals have of prevalent stereotypes, even …

Belief, willpower, and implicit bias

Keith Frankish Visiting Research Fellow, The Open University www.keithfrankish.com Jo sincerely affirms that black people are no less trustworthy than white people. Yet despite this, she consistently behaves in ways that reflect the assumption that black people are less trustworthy — subtly adjusting her behaviour towards black people across a …

Blame or Forgiveness?

That’s the question asked in an interesting post at the OUP Blog by Nicola Lacey (LSE) and Hannah Pickard (Birmingham). They write: What would the shape of penal philosophy and criminal justice practice be like with forgiveness in place as a guiding ideal? We think that it is possible to …

Call for commentators: “Personal Identity, Direction of Change, and Neuroethics”

Brains invites philosophers and academics in other relevant disciplines to act as a commentator for our upcoming symposium, the second in our series on papers published in the journal Neuroethics. The target paper by Kevin Tobia (Yale) is titled “Personal Identity, Direction of Change, and Neuroethics” (abstract below). We are looking …

#MindsOnline 2015, Session 1: Social Cognition

The Minds Online conference has begun, and our first session will be open for discussion through September 4. It is on the theme of Social Cognition, and includes the following papers: Tony Jack and Jared Friedman (Case Western Reserve): “Mapping cognitive structure onto the landscape of philosophical debate: an empirical framework …

Neuroethics Symposium on Focquaert & Schermer, “Moral Enhancement: Do Means Matter Morally?”

I am pleased to kick off our new symposium series on articles published in the journal Neuroethics with a discussion of Farah Focquaert and Maartje Schermer’s paper “Moral Enhancement: Do Means Matter Morally?” Below you will find a video introduction of the paper by the authors, together with a written introduction that …

Call for early career commentator

Brains invites an early career philosopher (graduate student, post-doc, or person who earned their PhD in the past five years) to act as a commentator for our upcoming symposium on an article appearing in the journal Neuroethics. The symposia will be similar to ones we have run the past two years on …