CFP: Issues in Philosophy of Memory

July 10-13, 2017 University of Cologne, Germany Conference Abstract: Philosophizing about memory is as old as philosophy itself. Despite the long tradition of inquiry, the philosophy of memory was until recently not recognized as an area of research in its own right. In recent years, however, the situation has changed …

Memory and the Self: Phenomenology, Science and Autobiography

Thanks to John Schwenkler for the invitation to guest-blog this week about my new book, Memory and the Self: Phenomenology, Science and Autobiography (Oxford University Press NY, 2016). *** Memory and the Autobiographical Self: The Problem Intuitively, it is not unreasonable to suppose that our episodic memories play a significant …

Applications are open for the 2017 Summer Seminars in Neuroscience and Philosophy

Calling all curious neuroscientists and philosophers! Collaborate in the summer seminars for neuroscience and philosophy, a three year program sponsored by the John Templeton Foundation and Duke University. Our goal is to advance knowledge at the intersection of these fields. Together we can apply cutting-edge scientific research to the big questions on …

The Unexplained Intellect: The Mind’s Dynamic Foundations

One theme of this week’s posts has been the claim that dynamic entities are among the most metaphysically basic of the things in the mental domain.  I’ve made only the vaguest gestures towards saying what I mean by this (in response to Gualtiero’s earlier comment). By dynamic entities, I mean …

CFP: Memory and Subjectivity

Call for posters: “Memory and Subjectivity” Grenoble (France), the 9th-10th-11th of June, 2016 We invite participants to submit a poster to the Memory and Subjectivity 2016 conference. Posters can restrict themselves to the philosophical perspective or the psychological one. Submissions Researchers interested in presenting a poster should prepare an overview …

Attention, conscious experience, and working memory

One argument for the view that all access-consciousness depends upon sensory representations is an inference to the best explanation (or rather, a series of them) that brings together recent work on consciousness with recent work on working memory. The argument builds on the findings of Bernard Baars, Stanislas Dehaene, and …

Introduction

Thanks to John Schwenkler and The Brains Blog for giving me this opportunity to tell you about my work. In this first post I’d like to describe the themes and ideas of my most recent book, Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy. In later posts …

An excellent profile of Felipe De Brigard

… at Duke Today. An excerpt: De Brigard believes that our considerations of what actually happened, what could have happened and what might happen are closely linked in our brains because these kinds of mental simulations are likely to allow us to rehearse ways the world could be. He think’s it’s …

SpaceTimeMind

You may (or may not) have noticed that Pete Mandik and Richard Brown (me) have started a podcast, called SpaceTimeMind, where we talk about tax law updates for 2014, uh, I mean, er, we talk about space and time and mind! The first episode is up now (and has been …

False selves and fading selves

Do confabulatory explanations and memory distortions occurring in the clinical population have any epistemic benefits? Let’s start by considering evidence for the view that autobiographical memory is instrumental to self-knowledge and identity formation processes. Autobiographical memory encompasses memories of specific events (e.g. how I felt when I passed my driving …