York University, Toronto May 10-11, 2018 When we perceive, we employ perceptual capacities by means of which we discriminate particulars in our environment. When we see the red shade of an apple we employ our capacity to discriminate red from other colors. More generally, we might say that to be …
Australasian Society for Philosophy and Psychology Call For Symposia And Papers 1st Annual Meeting December 5-7, 2018 Sydney, Australia The Australasian Society for Philosophy and Psychology invites proposals for symposia and papers for its first annual meeting, to be held in Sydney, 5-7 December 2018. Submissions are open to anyone with …
Call for Papers The Philosophy of Memory Essays in Philosophy Volume 19, Number 2 Issue Date: July 2018 Submission Deadline: March 1, 2018 Issue Editors: Ian O’Loughlin (Pacific University) and Sarah Robins (University of Kansas) Memory is a fundamental element of human—and more broadly, animal—intelligence and experience. Given memory’s importance, …
The Centre for Vision Research (CVR) at York University in Toronto, Canada offers a one-week, all-expenses-paid undergraduate summer school on vision science. This year’s program will be held June 4-8, 2018. This year’s summer school is being held in cooperation with the Vision: Science to Applications (VISTA) initiative that will …
In our previous posts, we have so far focused on: (1) clarifying our understanding of Ur-intentionality – REC’s positive proposal for understanding the thesis that basic cognition lacks content; (2) reviewing the problems faced by classic teleosemantic theories that motivate adopting REC’s proposal; and (3) detailing some of the theoretical …
In a direct challenge to radical, anti-representational proposals about how to conceive of cognition, Aizawa (2015) asks “If the brain does not contribute information processing or symbol manipulation or the transformation of representations … then what does it do?” (2015, 761–762). Given that REC embraces precisely such radicalisms, what alternative …
In our previous instalment to this blog series, we alluded to a subtle but pivotal adjustment that our Radically Enactive account of Cognition, REC, recommends making to what, in analytic circles, is the standard conception of minds. The recommendation is that we conceive of the intentional and phenomenal aspects of …
