This is the kind of question that might appear in the
extended mind literature. Here is a
quick and dirty kind of empirical argument.
(Maybe this kind of argument has already been considered
somewhere. If so, I’d be glad to hear.) Suppose that the properties and relations of lower-level entities
determine the states of higher-level entities.
Different higher-level states result from different combinations of properties
and relations of lower-level entities. Doesn’t
it stand to reason that an exotic state like consciousness would depend on an exotic
combination of properties and relations of lower-level entities, such as the
properties and relations of neurons?
This seems to me different than just a correlation
argument. Suppose, counterfactually,
that conscious states always occurred only with intact human bodies. Still, one might wonder what (not necessarily
proper) parts of the bodies determine consciousness. The dependency kind of consideration could
step up here.
How plausible is this?