Rethinking autonomy in Alzheimer’s diseaseDominique Waissbluth Usually, people with Alzheimer’s disease are considered no longer capable of performing autonomous acts. This claim is not only common among loved ones, but also among carers. It is usually taken to be established after medical and legal assessments that state this inability. However, …
Are Psychopaths Responsible? Walter Sinnott-Armstrong I will examine a question that sits at the intersection of moral psychology, philosophy, and criminal law: are psychopaths morally and legally responsible for what they do, and if not, what should we do with them? This is not only a theoretical problem about moral judgment, but also a deeply practical …
A workshop Cognition and Agency in Mental Disorder was held on November 18th and 19th 2025, in Santiago de Chile at Universidad Alberto Hurtado. It was organized by Federico Burdman and the Santiago Mind and Cognition group. As an international guest, the workshop featured Walter Sinnott-Armstrong from Duke University. This …
We are excited to announce that Alison Springle will be joining us as one of our new associate editors! Alison is an Assistant Professor at University of Miami, and works on a wide range of topics in philosophy of mind and science. For the blog, Alison will be working on …
We are thrilled to announce that Jorge Ignacio Fuentes Muñoz will be joining us at Brains as an Associate Editor. Jorge is an assistant professor at Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, and will be overseeing content in philosophy of mind and neuroscience, as well as keeping us updated on philosophical …
Hi All, In the next weeks and months, we’ll be making some exciting new additions to the editorial team at Brains. Two new Associate Editors will be introduced this week! I want to take the chance to give a huge thanks to two of our recent Associate Editors who will …
Reply to Chirimuuta Mazviita Chirimuuta is sympathetic to my deflationary construal of scientists’ representational talk when they characterize their models, but she sees objectionable elements of eliminativism in my discussion of representation outside the domain of science. She says of me: “If she has to choose between the ontology of the manifest image, and that of the scientific image, it’s the manifest that …
