Hi Everyone, Be sure to check out the call for abstracts for a forthcoming conference on Biological Naturalism and Consciousness at UCLA! https://philevents.org/event/show/149421 Details here: Call for Abstracts: Biological Naturalism about Consciousness November 5–6, 2026 · University of California, Los Angeles Can non-biological systems be conscious? If not, why not? …
Post on “The Vector Grounding Problem” for the Brains Blog Dimitri Coelho Mollo & Raphaël Millière We first preprinted “The Vector Grounding Problem” in April 2023, about four months after the release of ChatGPT. By that point, large language models (LLMs) had started to capture the attention of philosophers, but …
Formats of representation in large language models Fintan Mallory Assuming that artificial neural networks (ANNs) can, through training, come to represent the data upon which they were trained, or more general features of that data, then two natural questions that arise are what are the vehicles of representation within the …
Realist Representational Explanations of Agency Should Require Some Unity of Purpose Nicholas Shea My paper is about what it takes for an AI system to be an agent. It is relevant to Sprevak and Fallon’s PhiMiSci Special Issue on Representation in the Neurosciences and AI because conditions on AI agency …
‘Neuronal representation’ is not a defective concept: Ambiguity as a sign of science in progress Lotem Elber-Dorozko and Devin Gouvêa The term “neural representation” is extremely popular in cognitive neuroscience. Scientists often claim to have discovered neural properties that represent environmental features, such as specific visual objects or specific sounds. …
The Evidence for Representations Ken Aizawa It is commonly said that one reason to postulate mental representations is in order to explain behavior. I take this reasoning to be an instance of abductive reasoning, not to be identified with inference to the best explanation.[1] Empiricists have long been skeptical of …
Corey J. Maley Department of Philosophy Cognition, Agency, and Intelligence Center Purdue University cmaley@purdue.edu coreymaley.net The thesis of this paper is simple: structural representation and analog representation turn out to be two names for the same kind of representation. This may seem implausible, given that typical examples of structural representation …
