The Mechanism of Meaning

This is the first post in a series of five about my recent book, Talking About: An Intentionalist Theory of Reference (OUP, 2022). I will start things off by trying to convey the most basic motivation behind the book in terms that should be broadly accessible to theorists and philosophers …

Cognitive Science and the Different Kinds of Computation

When I went to graduate school in the 1990s, the mainstream assumptions were that (1) computation properly so called is digital and its limits are defined by classical computability theory, and (2) the debate in cognitive science was between “classical” (LOT) digital computation and “nonclassical” (connectionist in the narrow sense) …

Pritchard’s reply to commentaries on ‘Socially Extended Scientific Knowledge’

This is a part of the symposium on socially extended knowledge Replies to Commentaries By Duncan Pritchard I am very grateful to Mirko Farina, Orestis Palermos and Mark Sprevak for their insightful commentaries on my paper. I here give a short response to each, to promote further discussion.             Farina …

Commentary on ‘Socially Extended Scientific Knowledge’

This is a part of the symposium on socially extended knowledge Commentary on ‘Socially Extended Scientific Knowledge’ By Mark Sprevak 2 November 2022 One of the most interesting turnarounds in the paper is when an objection to socially extended knowledge from K. Brad Wray is considered, answered, and then turned …

Commentary on ‘Socially Extended Scientific Knowledge’

This is a part of the symposium on socially extended knowledge In Support of Distributed Scientific Knowledge By Orestis Palermos In what follows, I would like to focus on Duncan Pritchard’s novel idea of Socially Extended Knowledge and how it contrasts with the notion of Distributed Knowledge. Here is hopefully …

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