Response to Karl Friston: Pay Attention to Spherical Cows

The Idealized Mind (2025) suggests that the free energy principle (FEP) in theoretical neuroscience unifies all the different arguments covered in the book. The FEP is a GUT in more than one way. Friston’s commentary opens with the physicists’ spherical cow. In The Idealized Mind, chapter 9 seeks to establish …

Karl Friston: The Physics of ‘As If’

The Physics of ‘As If’  Karl Friston11 Queen Square Institute of Neurology, University of College London Milk production at a dairy farm was low, so the farmer wrote to the local university, asking for help. A multidisciplinary team of professors was assembled, headed by a theoretical physicist, and two weeks …

Author’s Reply to Corey Maley: No Literal (Exact Mathematical) Computation

The Idealized Mind (2025) distinguishes between computational modeling, where computational models are used to study target systems, and the additional practice of showing that neural systems literally perform computations. The former is a legitimate scientific practice. The latter is problematic.   Because computational neuroscientists take neural systems to be computational systems, …

Corey Maley: Comments on The Idealized Mind

COMMENTS ON THE IDEALIZED MIND, BY MICHAEL D. KIRCHHOFFCorey J. Maley Purdue University cjmaley@purdue.edu Michael Kirchhoff’s book The Idealized Mind has many original and thought-provoking ideas, touching on a number of subjects relevant to contemporary discussions in the theory and philosophy of cognitive science. Here, I will focus my comments …

Author’s Reply to Frances Egan: The Proof is in the LoGs

The Idealized Mind (2025) argues that discussion about neural representation and neural computation is based on idealized models. This has serious implications for defending realism about neural representation and neural computation.   Egan is right to think that my critique of computational models applies more widely than to her own account …

Frances Egan: Some Physical Systems (Literally) Compute

Some Physical Systems (Literally) ComputeFrances Egan  Rutgers University  In his ambitious new book, Michael Kirchhoff argues that computational models cannot be literally true of the real-world systems they purport to describe. In chapter 6 he aims his critique at my account of computational models (Egan 2018, 2020), but, as I understand it, the critique …

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