Mind and Action

Is it really possible to believe something while lacking the capacity to represent that belief? Intuitively, one could only believe that colonialism is the product of white supremacism if one can somehow represent this very belief in language or thought. But this intuitive idea is highly misleading. Or so I …

The Mechanism of Meaning

This is the first post in a series of five about my recent book, Talking About: An Intentionalist Theory of Reference (OUP, 2022). I will start things off by trying to convey the most basic motivation behind the book in terms that should be broadly accessible to theorists and philosophers …

Cognitive Science and the Different Kinds of Computation

When I went to graduate school in the 1990s, the mainstream assumptions were that (1) computation properly so called is digital and its limits are defined by classical computability theory, and (2) the debate in cognitive science was between “classical” (LOT) digital computation and “nonclassical” (connectionist in the narrow sense) …

Pritchard’s reply to commentaries on ‘Socially Extended Scientific Knowledge’

This is a part of the symposium on socially extended knowledge Replies to Commentaries By Duncan Pritchard I am very grateful to Mirko Farina, Orestis Palermos and Mark Sprevak for their insightful commentaries on my paper. I here give a short response to each, to promote further discussion.             Farina …

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