By Mona-Marie Wandrey and Marta Halina, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge (See all the posts in this series here.) We regard the proposal advanced by Will Bridewell and Alistair Isaac as a unique and promising methodological framework for advancing empirical progress in consciousness science. The …
By Matthias Michel, Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness, New York University (View all the posts in this series here.) Bridewell & Isaac’s idea is ‘refutation by implementation.’ If a model implements a theory of consciousness, that theory is wrong: “the ability to encode the core principles of a theory …
By: Will Bridewell, Naval Research Laboratory Alistair M.C. Isaac, University of Edinburgh (View all posts in this series here.) In part 1, we motivated an apophatic methodology for the science of consciousness. The basic idea was to take a model’s success at reproducing some set of consciousness-relevant phenomena as negative …
By: Will Bridewell, Naval Research Laboratory Alistair M.C. Isaac, University of Edinburgh (View all posts in this series here.) What can computational models tell us about consciousness? Traditionally, the computational study of consciousness has been linked to metaphysical theories that reduce conscious states to their functional role. In a recent …
We are excited to have a great set of posts this week focusing on computational modeling and consciousness! We will begin with two posts by Will Bridewell and Alistair Isaac, outlining their “apophatic” approach to modeling consciousness. We’ll then have two commentaries, one by Matthias Michel and another by Marta …
By Tillman Vierkant, University of Edinburgh (See all the posts in this series here.) I am very grateful to Gloria Andrada, Paulius Rimkevicius and Ting Huang for their very insightful comments. I hope that my replies will help to clarify some of the issues raised and stimulate further discussion. Let …
