Just a quick note that I recently published an article in The Philosophical Forum , “A New Theory of Free Will“, that may be of interest to readers (a free PDF of the penultimate draft is available here). Here’s the abstract:
This paper shows that several live philosophical and scientific hypotheses – including the holographic principle and multiverse theory in quantum physics, and eternalism and mind-body dualism in philosophy – jointly imply an audacious new theory of free will. This new theory, “Libertarian Compatibilism”, holds that the physical world is an eternally existing array of two-dimensional information – a vast number of possible pasts, presents, and futures – and the mind a nonphysical entity or set of properties that “read” that physical information off to subjective conscious awareness (in much the same way that a song written on an ordinary compact-disc is only played when read by an outside medium, i.e. a CD-player). According to this theory, every possible physical “timeline” in the multiverse may be fully physically deterministic or physically-causally closed but each person’s consciousness still entirely free to choose, ex nihilo, outside of the physical order, which physically-closed timeline is experienced by conscious observers. Although Libertarian Compatibilism is admittedly fantastic, I show that it not only follows from several live scientific and philosophical hypotheses, I also show that it (1) is a far more explanatorily powerful model of quantum mechanics than more traditional interpretations (e.g. the Copenhagen, Everett, and Bohmian interpretations), (2) makes determinate, testable empirical predictions in quantum theory, and finally, (3) predicts and explains the very existence of a number of philosophical debates and positions in the philosophy of mind, time, personal identity, and free will. First, I show that whereas traditional interpretations of quantum mechanics are all philosophically problematic and roughly as ontologically “extravagant” as Libertarian Compatibilism – in that they all posit “unseen” processes – Libertarian Compatibilism is nearly identical in structure to the only working simulation that human beings have ever constructed capable of reproducing (and so explaining) every general feature of quantum mechanics we perceive: namely, massive-multiplayer-online-roleplaying videogames (or MMORPGs). Although I am not the first to suggest that our world is akin to a computer simulation, I show that existing MMORPGs (online simulations we have already created) actually reproduce every general feature of quantum mechanics within their simulated-world reference-frames. Second, I show that existing MMORPGs also replicate (and so explain) many philosophical problems we face in the philosophy of mind, time, personal identity, and free will – all while conforming to the Libertarian Compatibilist model of reality. I conclude, as such, that as fantastic and metaphysically extravagant as Libertarian Compatibilism may initially seem, it may well be true. It explains a number of features of our reality that no other physical or metaphysical theory does.
Just one question: how does it differ from the many-mind interpretation?
Hi Quentin: Thank you for your very good question. It differs from the many-minds interpretation in a number of important respects.
First respect: in the many-minds interpretation, there is no definite macro-realm of physical reality or information (the infinity of minds is *all* there is to quantum decoherence). In contrast, on Libertarian Compatibilism (my view), there is a sense in which the macro-physical world is definite: it is an eternally array of 2-dimensional information being *measured* by minds in a higher frame-of-reference.
I think there are a number of reasons to think my picture is more likely to be true. Among other things, my view — unlike many-minds — is structurally identical to simulations we’ve already created that reproduce quantum phenomena and “save the appearances” of our world (i.e. peer-to-peer networked MMORPGs). In contrast, we have no analogous “working model” of many-minds — and my theory is far more ontologically parsimonious to boot.
Second respect: the many-minds interpretation holds that an infinity of minds split into *every* possible quantum “path” (eigenstate) — in essence populating a multiverse with an infinity of minds across an infinity of possible pasts, presents, and futures. As I argue and imply in the paper, this interpretation violates Occam’s Razor in important ways that my theory does not (my view does not populate an entire multiverse full of an infinity of minds — but only *our* minds, which trace out a *single* path through the multiverse, collapsing *possible* “paths” down to a single, intersubjectively experienced reality.
Third: in many-minds, each “physical” observer has a postulated infinity of continuous minds *within* a single world (much as in 4-dimensional metaphysics different “wormstages” can imply there are two, three, etc. *person-stages* overlapping in a single body at a time). On many minds, at every quantum instant, this infinity of minds “branches out” into infinite subsets. In contrast, on my view, each person has only *one* mind which, through our choices, traverses only *one* path through the physical multiverse forward in time. Again, I think my view is far preferable (for, I think, fairly clear reasons).
There are probably a number of other relevant differences I’m not thinking of right now. But those are some. Hope they clear things up a bit.
Thank you for your response, I’ve got a better understanding of what is implied by your theory now. However I have an other question.
When I measure, say, the spin of an electron: would you say that I choose which value it will take? I don’t have the feeling that such external events depend on my will, plus then you have the problem of other observers (this would be an interpretation close to that of Wigner which he finally abandoned). The other option is that the electron chooses its spin value when measured.
Any electron measurement can lead to branching in the multiverse, and the number of branching (if countable) is actually far more important than those which could be subjected to human choices. You could assume that random collapses occur in addition to human choices, but I am not sure that you are willing to accept such hybrid theories (you’d inherit their drawbacks).
In brief, your interpretation seems to entail panpsychism. Am I right?
Hi question: thanks for another very good question.
Note: that should have been an “A” in my previous comment, not a smilely face. Don’t know why the comment system automatically transformed it. Must be a glitch in the matrix.
I also just noticed your name auto-corrected to “question”! Oops. Anyway, it just occurred to me that, in case my post wasn’t crystal clear on this, the “hybrid” aspect of the theory as follows:
Actually I am quite dubious (to say the least) that mmorpg somehow “reproduce” quantum mechanics. My feeling is that they merely reproduce a classicaly branching universe with epistemic indeterminacy, which is totally different from quantum indeterminacy. If the position of a leaf is uncertain in the game, you can still be sure that it has a definite position although you don’t know it. QM cannot be interpreted interpreted that way, hence the measurement problem (e.g. would you obtain an interference pattern involving the two possible position of a leaf if you decided to measure its speed instead? Or could you reproduce an EPR experiment in a mmorpg which violate Bell’s inequality?)
Regarding your hybrid view, how do you justify that two different sources of randomness take place in exactly the same framework, and how do you differenciate them? Then how do you explain that specific material organisations (living things) implement one kind of randomness and not the other?
Hi again, Quentin: I appreciate your skepticism. However, I think it is misplaced. Allow me to explain why.
Sorry — forgot to address your question about animals. I’m not sure what you mean when you ask me how I would “justify” taking the two sources of randomness to occur. The paper doesn’t “justify” this claim so much as it makes it as an empirical prediction.
My point was that external events can cause branching (whether a leaf falls or not is a different world). As far as I can tell, you propose a collapse theory for them (introduction of noise). However then your libertarian theory becomes superfluous, since collapse theories already solve the measurement problem. Besides, you seem to believe that the libertarian theory would be at odd with current empirical data (because the will is non random). So your theory is both superfluous and speculative, which I think is a serious problem.
About whether mmorpg reproduce QM or not (discussion below):
EPR is central to QM and Bell’s theorem is a fundamental meta-theoretical theorem. No measurement problem without them.
If a leaf can be observed in different positions by different observers, this is *not* QM. If a leaf is in a superposition of positions when *not* observed, then this is QM. Per my understanding, mmorpg reproduce the first alternative?
Hi Quentin: Thanks for pressing these issues. Here are my thoughts in reply: