Two fronts against Chalmers

In the following I look at two fronts on which you might battle Chalmers’ arguments against physicalism about consciousness. The first is from Polgar’s recent paper (recently discussed by Richard Brown) in which he briefly critique’s Chalmers’ implicit theory of reduction. The second is the more common strategy of attacking him for assuming he can conceive of zombies in the first place. I argue that the second strategy is better, though they are not mutually exclusive.

First mention of ‘content/vehicle’ distinction?

The conceptual distinction between representational vehicles and representational contents is very old, probably older than Plato. Lately, however, I’ve been wondering when the first use of this actual terminology emerged. Pete Mandik took time out from hammering brains to tell me he thinks the first use of this terminology might …

Keeping score of pragmatic inferentialism

The following is slightly revised set of questions I posted over at  Words and Other Things. Since dipping my toe into Brandom’s inferential-role semantics about ten years ago, these are the questions that still linger. Most of them stem from the fact that (at least in the bits I’ve read) …

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