Inference in (neuro)cognitive systems By Urte Laukaityte and Matteo Colombo Psychologists speak of perceiving as inferring. Neuroscientists maintain that the brain solves inference problems. Biologists say that individual cells infer the structure of their environment. Computer scientists suggest artificial systems can at times draw better inferences than humans. For many …
Frames of Discovery and the Format of Cognitive Representation By Dimitri Coelho Mollo & Alfredo Vernazzani A central assumption in contemporary cognitive science and AI is that cognition involves internal representations. Quite like public, external representations, such as texts, pictures and maps, internal representations carry contents (i.e. they are about …
Cognitive ontology in terms of cognitive homology – The role of brain, behavior, and environment for individuating cognitive categories By Beate Krickel and Mariel Goddu How should we categorize the mind’s capacities? This is the cognitive ontology question: how to carve up cognition in a way that supports scientific prediction, explanation, …
Rethinking the Mind with Neuroscience: Introducing Neurocognitive Foundations of Mind By Gualtiero Piccinini Many thanks to Dan Burnston for this opportunity to introduce the new edited volume, Neurocognitive Foundations of Mind. For decades, many philosophers of mind wrestled with the question of what the mind is and how it works …
Join us this week for a symposium on the new book, Neurocognitive Foundations of Mind, edited by Brains Blog founder Gualtiero Piccinini!
Styles of Rationality was written 20 years ago, well prior to any thoughts of (unicepts of) unicepts. The question of Hurley and Nudds’ book Rational Animals? was whether non-human animals were rational in any sense. I would have to think through that again now. It would be important not …
Alison Springle, University of Miami Ruth’s second post echoes the key themes of one of my favorite essays: Ruth’s “Styles of Rationality” (Ch. 4 of Hurley & Nudds 2006 Rational Animals?). A key move Ruth makes in that essay is to shift our conception of practical reasoning from the Aristotelian …
