Computation without Representation
This entry was posted on 9/22/2006 3:35 PM and is filed under Philosophy of Science,Computation and Logic.
As some of you may know, I am engaged in a long-term campaign against the view that concrete computations (computational states, computing mechanisms) are individuated, even in part, by their semantic properties. Of course, computations may be interpreted, i.e., assigned semantic content, but this is not part of their individuation. Instead, I argue that concrete computations are individuated by their functional properties, as specified by a mechanistic explanation of the relevant phenomenon. Actually, if you grant me an abstract notion of mechanism, the same is true for abstract computations. At least, this is how things works for the notion of computation studied within computability theory and computer science.
As of today,
a preliminary articulation and defense of this view is available online at
Philosophical Studies. (If your library does not subscribe to Phil. Studies, you can also find it
here.)