Improving on Heterophenomenology?
I've written a paper comparing and contrasting Dennett's Heterophenomenology and the "self-measurement methodology of fist-person data". The latter is an account of first-person data and their use in science that I've been articulating over the last few years. Needless to say, I argue that my account is better than Heterophenomenology, but I also try to make clear that I agree with Heterophenomenology on some important points.
Abstract: Heterophenomenology is a third-person methodology proposed by Daniel Dennett for using first-person reports as scientific evidence. I argue that heterophenomenology can be improved by making six changes: (i) setting aside consciousness, (ii) including other sources of first-person data besides first-person reports, (iii) abandoning agnosticism as to the truth value of the reports in favor of the most plausible assumptions we can make about what can be learned from the data, (iv) interpreting first-person reports (and other first-person behaviors) directly in terms of target mental states rather than in terms of beliefs about them, (v) dropping any residual commitment to incorrigibility of first-person reports, and (vi) recognizing that third-person methodology does have positive effects on scientific practices. When these changes are made, heterophenomenology turns into the self-measurement methodology of first-person data that I have defended in previous papers.
Some other pieces of my account may be found here, here, and here.
Today the new paper was accepted for a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies edited by Richard Brown. If anyone has comments, they would be very welcome. (Brown has requested the final version ASAP.)
Abstract: Heterophenomenology is a third-person methodology proposed by Daniel Dennett for using first-person reports as scientific evidence. I argue that heterophenomenology can be improved by making six changes: (i) setting aside consciousness, (ii) including other sources of first-person data besides first-person reports, (iii) abandoning agnosticism as to the truth value of the reports in favor of the most plausible assumptions we can make about what can be learned from the data, (iv) interpreting first-person reports (and other first-person behaviors) directly in terms of target mental states rather than in terms of beliefs about them, (v) dropping any residual commitment to incorrigibility of first-person reports, and (vi) recognizing that third-person methodology does have positive effects on scientific practices. When these changes are made, heterophenomenology turns into the self-measurement methodology of first-person data that I have defended in previous papers.
Some other pieces of my account may be found here, here, and here.
Today the new paper was accepted for a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies edited by Richard Brown. If anyone has comments, they would be very welcome. (Brown has requested the final version ASAP.)
Posted by gualtiero piccinini at 1/28/2010 2:38 PM 
Categories: Mindreading, Consciousness
Tags: mindreading consciousness
Categories: Mindreading, Consciousness
Tags: mindreading consciousness
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4/12/2010 10:21 AM
Brains wrote:
The special issue of The Journal of Consciousness Studies that I edited featuring descendants of selected papers from the first online consciousness conference is now out (including an excellent piece by Gualtiero that he bloged about previously)…it is entitled ‘Fishy and Here’ (from Clare Batty’s paper)…I hope that is meant as an illustration of phenomenal consciousness and not as a comment on the papers contained in the issue " class="wp-smiley" style="padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 5px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 5px; " /> ... -
4/12/2010 10:23 AM
Brains wrote:
The special issue of The Journal of Consciousness Studies that I edited featuring descendants of selected papers from the first online consciousness conference is now out (including an excellent piece by Gualtiero that he bloged about previously)…it is entitled ‘Fishy and Here’ (from Clare Batty’s paper)…I hope that is meant as an illustration of phenomenal consciousness and not as a comment on the papers contained in the issue ...
I'm curious what you think of Davidson's radical interpretation and the clarifications to it offered by Ludwig and LePore.
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This Brown sounds very demanding!
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Hi Gualtiero,
Congrats on the acceptance and thanks for the acknowledgment!
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Thanks for the comments!
Tony, I don't remember enough about Davidson and I don't know enough about Ludwig and Lepore on Davidson to form an informed opinion. Should I look into it?
Richard, thanks again for organizing the fabulous Consciousness Online conference and for editing the special issue of JCS.
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Hi, Gualtiero,
Congratulations again on Lori Lea Shelley-P!
Back in the '80's people used to ask why Dennett wasn't Davidson (or vice versa); and your list of 6 changes reminded me of candidate catalogues of the differences. Davidson did not, I think, propose to treat speakers as measuring instruments; I think your idea is genuinely new and different. (I need to mull over the idea for a few days; I'm worried that there are disanalogies there also.) Davidson did think of interpretation in terms of measurement (the empirical system is the speaker, and the measurement system is the interpreter's own language), but that points only in the direction of the interpreter using instruments to gather data for interpretation, but not yet to saying what instruments those might be. Let me know if you want refs to Davidson. I'm not actually certain what Ludwig and Lepore would say in this area, but they're the go-to guys for Davidson exegesis.
--Tony
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