(cross-posted at Philosophy Sucks!)
Via David Rosenthal-
There was a conference entitled “Theory Of Consciousness In Analytic Phenomenology And Philosophy Of Mind,”
at the University of Bern, Switzerland, May 27-29, 2009.
Podcasts of the talks are, for the next 2-3 years, at
https://cast.switch.ch/vod/channels/g3bo2419i
Talks are by David M. Rosenthal, Gianfranco Soldati, Andrea Borsato, David Woodruff Smith, Eduard Marbach, Sebastian Leugger, Dan Zahavi, Uriah Kriegel, Michelle Montague, and Galen Strawson.
The program is at
https://www.philosophie.ch/events/esap/es_single.php?action=date&eventid=299
I only listened to David R, Uriah, and Galen’s talks and the sound quality is not always even but there is a lot of interesting stuff going on…well worth the listen.
This is something that I am very glad to see. I am definitely one of those who thinks that cognitive phenomenology is real (and I think David Rosenthal is committed to it so it was interesting to hear him at this conference) though I don’t think that my view is the standard one. I, like Strawson, want to distinguish between the traditional kind of externalist content (though I, like Devitt, also allow inferential content) and the cognitive phenomenology. I take the cognitive phenomenology to go with the mental attitude that we take towards the traditional content. Let’s take belief, desire, and intention. These are the basic kinds of cognitive mental attitudes (whether there are more or if all other reduce to combinations of these three is a contentious issue…I take no stand on that here). Each one of these is really the name for a family of mental attitudes. So for belief we have a range between complete skepticism to mild doubt to probably true to complete certitude. What these have in common is a subjective sense of confidence as to whether something is actually true. To believe that p is to be subjectively certain that p is true, or to be convinced that p is true. Likewise, to doubt that p is to be subjectively uncertain that p is true. Likewise to want something is to have a subjective longing for it and to have an intention to A is to feel subjectively resolved to do A.
This explains all of the relevant data; for instance one main line of evidence for cognitive phenomenology is the experience that one has when one understands a sentence in a language one speaks. I agree that there is something that it is like for the person who understands a sentence of English but I claim that this is the result of the person coming to have some conscious mental attitude held towards the traditional content. So, when Galen tells me that the Earth weighs four times more than the Moon, I might feel surprise and wonder whether that were really true. Of course one might just ‘entertain’ the content but even here one take a qualitatively neutral mental attitude towards the content. This also allows us to explain why it is so many people dismiss cognitive phenomenology. Since my belief that 2+2=4 and my belief that New York City is on the East Coast of the United States of America are both things that I take to be beyond dispute they will feel subjectively similar when I introspect. Since I am looking for a phenomenological difference between the two thoughts I overlook their similarity. Interestingly this is supported by the reports of some schizophrenics who say that they can distinguish their delusional beliefs from their ‘normal’ ones by how they feel.
What then are we to say about unconscious beliefs, desires, and intentions? My claim is that conscious beliefs are just are the beliefs which we are conscious of ourselves as having and so is a higher-order view about consciousness. To have a conscious belief that p if just for one to have a higher-order state to the effect that one believes p. One feels subjectively certain about P just because one is conscious of oneself as believing P. When the belief is unconscious I have the same mental attitude held towards the traditional content but I am no longer conscious of myself as believing it and so there is nothing that it is like for me to believe it. I think that we can at this point give a homomorphism account of the mental attitudes. The mental attitudes come in families and there will be similarities and differences between these families that preserve the similarities and differences between the illocutionary forces of utterances used to express the mental attitude+traditional content…but that is another story….
Without a doubt, there is something it is like to think. More specifically, it seems pretty plausible that there is something it’s like to think that NYC is on the East Coast of USA and something different it’s like to think that 2+2=4. I’m not getting what this has to do with /believing/ either of these things, though. Surely no belief is like anything (although it might cause one to think various thoughts, which would be like something). Believing that p isn’t a way of thinking that p, is it? Inclined to think that belief is a state while thinking is an activity …
Richard I haven’t had time to listen to the podcast that you posted (nor read-up on the relevant literature) but I started thinking more about this issue after your previous post. I was listening to Michael Finnissy play some Laurence Crane (Tim Crane’s brother no less!) compositions for piano; they’re very sparse, very minimalist. The point here is that many of the pieces have quite sizeable gaps between the notes (chords, etc.) regularly leaving one with a sense of anticipation. Every time the next note was finally sounded, the anticipation was dissolved; there was something it was like to feel that sense of satisfaction. My issue is in separating out the thought and the phenomenology. Rather than the thought itself having some kind of phenomenology couldn’t it be the case that such thoughts are merely accompanied by a (separate/separable) conscious state? In this particular case one is registering the fact that one’s anticipation has been satisfied at the same time that one has the experience of hearing the relevant note, subsequently mistaking the experience of hearing the note for a thought with a distinct phenomenology.
Something else concerns me here. Take your ‘cool’ belief that “2+2=4.” It seems to me that you have to accept there’s a difference between consciously entertaining, on the one hand, “I believe that 2+2=4” and, on the other, believing “2+2=4” in-as-much-as you will automatically assent to it because of your vast experience with it? The latter case seems like a belief if any thing is, but you aren’t *consciously* believing it (because you aren’t consciously believing); hence, on your account, there shouldn’t be any accompanying phenomenology. My concern is, just how many of our so-called *beliefs* about anything are conscious in the first place? Actually, you might be happy to embrace this second point; it may not be an argument against your position so much as a slight refinement of it!
Hi Benj, thanks for the comment and welcome to Brains!
Hi Rik, thanks for the comment! Sorry for the delay in getting back to you I have been on vacation