By Brandon Towl
Hello again Brains readers– I’m turning to you again for your help and insights.
Here is a link to a draft of a paper I am working on tentatively entitled “Multiple Realizability without Multiply Realizable Properties”. I’d appreciate any feedback or comments on it from interested parties.
The gist of the paper is this: recent debates about multiple realizability (MR) seem to arise between two camps that start with different considerations. On the one side, opponents of MR recognize that the idea of MR properties is metaphysically suspect. And indeed, the problems they raise for the other side make a strong case against the idea that there are such properties. On the other side, proponents of MR point out (rightly, I think) the indispensability of MR for making sense of special science explanations. I try to adjudicate the debate by raising the possibility of MR (or MR kinds, if you will) without the need for MR properties per se.
If this sounds interesting to anyone, I’d love to hear what Brains readers think!