Birmingham (UK), 8-9 May 2014
10:30-11:30 – Ryan McKay (Royal Holloway) and Maarten Boudry (University of Ghent): “In Defence of False Beliefs?”
11:40-12:40 – Lisa Bortolotti (University of Birmingham): “Epistemic Costs and Benefits of Delusional Beliefs”.
14:00-15:00 – Katerina Fotopoulou (University College London): “Inferring the Self: Neurological Exaggerations of Normally Imperfect Inferences about the Body”
15:00-16:00 – Martin Conway (City University London): “Memory, Reality, and Consciousness in the Remembering-Imaging System”
16:30-17:30 – Ema Sullivan-Bissett (University of Birmingham): “The Epistemic Status of Confabulatory Explanations”
9:30-10:30 – Petter Johansson and Lars Hall (University of Lund): “Choice Blindness and the Flexibility of Attitude Formation: Why not Knowing why might be a Good Thing”
11:00-12:00 – Jules Holroyd (University of Nottingham): “Implicit Bias, Awareness Conditions, and Epistemic Innocence”
12:00-13:00 – Miranda Fricker (University of Sheffield): “Fault and No-fault Epistemic Responsibility for Implicit Prejudice”
If you are interested in attending this workshop, please contact Ema Sullivan-Bissett (e.l.sullivan-bissett AT bham.ac.uk) to inquire about availability.