Extending epistemic innocence beyond belief

A picture of continuity Some beliefs are epistemically innocent when they are irrational but provide epistemic benefits that would not be available otherwise. We already saw some examples: delusion, confabulation, and optimistically biased beliefs. Here I explain why I apply epistemic innocence to different types of beliefs across clinical and …

Optimism: ignorance or hope?

Powerful agents We are likely to overestimate our capacities and make exceedingly rosy predictions about our future. This widespread bias towards optimism is a robust finding in psychology. It is also a clear case of epistemic irrationality which has serious implications for risk assessment. According to a recent article, unrealistic …

Confabulation: good, bad, or inevitable?

Incurable confabulators Philosophers sometimes describe humans as rational animals. It would be more accurate to say that we are confabulating animals. The problem is that it is not always easy to distinguish our frequent practice of confabulation from the rare moments when we exercise our rationality. A provocative idea is …

Delusions revisited

Cases of innocence In my previous post I started telling you about epistemic innocence. Some irrational beliefs can have epistemic benefits that would be impossible or difficult to attain by other means. This does not cancel out their irrationality, but makes them innocent to the extent that, in at least …

Costs and Benefits of Imperfect Cognitions

Workshop Costs and Benefits of Imperfect Cognitions Birmingham (UK), 8-9 May 2014 8th May 10:30-11:30 – Ryan McKay (Royal Holloway) and Maarten Boudry (University of Ghent): “In Defence of False Beliefs?” 11:40-12:40 – Lisa Bortolotti (University of Birmingham): “Epistemic Costs and Benefits of Delusional Beliefs”. 14:00-15:00 – Katerina Fotopoulou (University …

Is there anything good about delusions?

In my last post I want to go back to delusions. Isn’t it just hopeless to suggest that they can achieve epistemic innocence? It probably is, as delusions violate all norms of rationality for beliefs we can think of. But it is important to ask whether delusions have any redeeming …

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