Lisa Bortolotti introduces her book, The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs (Oxford, 2020), and explains how epistemic innocence differs from justification.
A picture of continuity Some beliefs are epistemically innocent when they are irrational but provide epistemic benefits that would not be available otherwise. We already saw some examples: delusion, confabulation, and optimistically biased beliefs. Here I explain why I apply epistemic innocence to different types of beliefs across clinical and …
Powerful agents We are likely to overestimate our capacities and make exceedingly rosy predictions about our future. This widespread bias towards optimism is a robust finding in psychology. It is also a clear case of epistemic irrationality which has serious implications for risk assessment. According to a recent article, unrealistic …
Incurable confabulators Philosophers sometimes describe humans as rational animals. It would be more accurate to say that we are confabulating animals. The problem is that it is not always easy to distinguish our frequent practice of confabulation from the rare moments when we exercise our rationality. A provocative idea is …
Cases of innocence In my previous post I started telling you about epistemic innocence. Some irrational beliefs can have epistemic benefits that would be impossible or difficult to attain by other means. This does not cancel out their irrationality, but makes them innocent to the extent that, in at least …
Silver linings I took this photograph in a place that means a lot to me, the lagoon in Nora, Sardinia. It is a wetland which is home to amazing wildlife and also to a rescue centre for injured sea turtles. To me, it is a picture of hope. There are …
We are thrilled that Lisa Bortolotti is joining us until Friday for a sneak peak at their new book The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs (Oxford, 2020). You can find all their posts on one page here (as they become available).
