The EC literature contains two apparently different claims.Human cognitive systems extend into the body and environment.Human cognitive processes extend into the body and environment. Isn’t this second claim the more radical? There are lots of systems in which the identifying process does not pervade the whole of the system, e.g. …
Quick and dirty, short and sweet: Yes. Essentially every single known psychological property is multiply realizable by many, many distinct amino acid sequences.
This is the kind of question that might appear in the extended mind literature. Here is a quick and dirty kind of empirical argument. (Maybe this kind of argument has already been considered somewhere. If so, I’d be glad to hear.) Suppose that the properties and relations of lower-level entities …
Have I got this right that the principal reasons people have had for rejecting representations is the stuff from dynamical systems theory and mobile robotics? DS don’t have to have representations and neither do mobile robots. But, why not say that if they don’t have representations, they aren’t thinking either? …
