Pritchard’s reply to commentaries on ‘Socially Extended Scientific Knowledge’

This is a part of the symposium on socially extended knowledge Replies to Commentaries By Duncan Pritchard I am very grateful to Mirko Farina, Orestis Palermos and Mark Sprevak for their insightful commentaries on my paper. I here give a short response to each, to promote further discussion.             Farina …

Commentary on ‘Socially Extended Scientific Knowledge’

This is a part of the symposium on socially extended knowledge Commentary on ‘Socially Extended Scientific Knowledge’ By Mark Sprevak 2 November 2022 One of the most interesting turnarounds in the paper is when an objection to socially extended knowledge from K. Brad Wray is considered, answered, and then turned …

Commentary on ‘Socially Extended Scientific Knowledge’

This is a part of the symposium on socially extended knowledge In Support of Distributed Scientific Knowledge By Orestis Palermos In what follows, I would like to focus on Duncan Pritchard’s novel idea of Socially Extended Knowledge and how it contrasts with the notion of Distributed Knowledge. Here is hopefully …

Commentary on ‘Socially Extended Scientific Knowledge’

This is a part of the symposium on socially extended knowledge Commentary on ‘Socially Extended Scientific Knowledge’ by Mirko Farina[1] Pritchard’s Socially Extended Scientific Knowledge is part of a special issue titled: ‘Distributed and Embodied Cognition in Scientific Contexts’. The goal of the special issue is to investigate and critically …

Symposium on Pritchard’s Socially Extended Scientific Knowledge

It’s my pleasure to share this symposium, which discusses a recent paper by Duncan Pritchard’s (UCI). The paper is named Socially Extended Scientific Knowledge’, and it’s published in Frontiers in Psychology, SI, ‘Distributed and Embodied Cognition in Scientific Contexts’. The symposium includes commentaries by Mirko Farina (Innopolis University), Orestis Palermos (Cardiff …

3. Aspects of the Self

In the previous post, I showed how the self-structure could be specified. The self has also some properties, e.g., phenomenal, social, and ethical ones, that are capable of being specified in structural terms. Let us begin with phenomenal aspects, which amount to the capacity to have consciousness and intentional states. …

2. Specifying Self-Structures

The Structural Realist theory of the Self (SRS) is presented as an extension of structural realism in the philosophy of many-particle physics. Structural realism addresses the problem of conflicting ontological consequences with regards to the existence of individual objects at the sub-particle level by making commitments to commonalities. In the …

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