Cognitive Phenomenology: The Role of Introspection

Cognition / Consciousness / Elijah Chudnoff: Cognitive Phenomenology / Philosophy of Mind

In my first post I isolated Irreducibility as the main thesis in dispute about cognitive phenomenology: Irreducibility: Some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. In this post I am going to write about the role introspection should play in helping us decide …

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Cognitive Phenomenology: What is the Issue?

Cognition / Consciousness / Elijah Chudnoff: Cognitive Phenomenology / Philosophy of Mind

First off, thanks to John Schwenkler for inviting me to write a few posts about my new book, Cognitive Phenomenology, and also for inviting other authors to write about their new books. I’ve really enjoyed following this series on the Brains Blog. In this post I will isolate what I …

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