Forming Impressions: Expertise in Perception and Intuition (4)

This is the fourth in a series of posts about my recently published book, Forming Impressions: Expertise in Perception and Intuition (OUP, 2020). Intuition in Philosophy Let’s call the following picture of philosophy the Standard Picture. [A] Philosophers make judgments about knowledge, freedom, wrongness, etc. based on intuitions about knowledge, …

Forming Impressions: Expertise in Perception and Intuition (3)

This is the third in a series of posts about my recently published book, Forming Impressions: Expertise in Perception and Intuition (OUP, 2020). Presentational Conservatism Part 2 of Forming Impressions develops an epistemology of experiences that manifest expertise. My approach is first to discuss the epistemology of experience in general, …

Forming Impressions: Expertise in Perception and Intuition (2)

This is the second in a series of posts about my recently published book, Forming Impressions: Expertise in Perception and Intuition (OUP, 2020). Birds and Physics Problems In Chapters 2 and 3 of Forming Impressions, I argue that both expert perception and expert intuition manifest themselves in experience. When an …

Forming Impressions: Expertise in Perception and Intuition (1)

Introduction Radiologists can reliably tell whether a seen x-ray image is abnormal without scanning its details. This is an example of expert perception. Chess masters immediately think of superior moves, so that the move they ultimately choose differs from these initial options only in difficult cases. This is an example …

Cognitive Phenomenology: Why Bother?

I will conclude this series of posts by saying something about why I think cognitive phenomenology is significant. The basic idea is that phenomenology in general is connected to epistemology, value theory, and semantics via the notion of awareness, and cognitive phenomenology in particular is connected to these areas via …

Cognitive Phenomenology: Questions of Value

According to Mill “pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends.” This does not imply that the good life is a degrading one, fit for swine, however, at least partly because there are “pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral …

Cognitive Phenomenology: The Stream of Consciousness

According to William James experiences, including conscious thoughts, flow in a stream of consciousness. Peter Geach argued that whatever we say about other experiences, conscious thoughts at least do not flow, but rather occur in discrete sequences. A number of recent arguments against cognitive phenomenology take Geach’s criticisms of James …

Cognitive Phenomenology: The Role of Introspection

In my first post I isolated Irreducibility as the main thesis in dispute about cognitive phenomenology: Irreducibility: Some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. In this post I am going to write about the role introspection should play in helping us decide …

Cognitive Phenomenology: What is the Issue?

First off, thanks to John Schwenkler for inviting me to write a few posts about my new book, Cognitive Phenomenology, and also for inviting other authors to write about their new books. I’ve really enjoyed following this series on the Brains Blog. In this post I will isolate what I …

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