A number of philosophers have suggested that delusional people do not believe their delusions; they only imagine them and then mistake their imagining for a belief (Greg Currie has a view along these lines: in his recent book, Phil Gerrans defends a related view). What follows are a few inchoate …
For the remainder of my posts here, I’m going to move on to new work, and try out some ideas. This post will continue on the theme of consciousness, but turn to a very different question. The work I will discuss in this post is conducted in collaboration with Will …
This post continues on from the last. I’m going to assume the claims I made in that post – in particular, that implicit attitudes are patchy endorsements – though in fact what I will say would go through on most rival views (the only extant view on which it would be …
Let me begin by thanking John Schwenkler for the invitation to blog here at Brains. I’m not really a specialist in philosophy of mind (or in, well, anything) but a lot of my recent work is concerned with mind-y (and brain-y) issues. I find it hard to get excited about …
