Distinctively HumanSarah Fisher In Concepts at the Interface, Shea offers us a compelling account of what concepts are and why they matter. His nuanced and careful treatment captures the function and feel of offline deliberation, ranging from abstract logical reasoning to building concrete suppositional scenarios. The puzzle motivating Shea’s analysis …
Predication as Structural Representation; Concepts as Information Compression-Decompression HubsJohan Heemskerk and Gualtiero Piccinini Shea’s new book, Concepts at the Interface, is a trove of important ideas. To give just a few examples: Shea draws several important distinctions that criss-cross existing categories though arguably cutting deeper – such as the distinction …
Some Roles for Language in Concept-Driven Thinking: Comments on Nicholas Shea’s Concepts at the InterfaceEric MargolisUniversity of British Columbia There are many different questions that philosophers should be asking about concepts. One of the things that makes Concepts at the Interface such a valuable book is that it recognizes that …
This week, we are featuring a symposium on Nick Shea’s recent book, Concepts at the Interface. We have three great commentaries from Eric Margolis, Johan Heemskerk and Gualtiero Piccinini, and Sarah Fisher, then responses from Nick on Thursday and Friday. Please join us!
Talking to Ourselves: Inner Speech and Natural Language as a Language of Thought By Wade Munroe We talk to ourselves. Sometimes we do so out loud. However, frequently, we do so without making a sound. We use inner speech. In my contribution to Neurocognitive Foundations of Mind, I argue that …
Inference in (neuro)cognitive systems By Urte Laukaityte and Matteo Colombo Psychologists speak of perceiving as inferring. Neuroscientists maintain that the brain solves inference problems. Biologists say that individual cells infer the structure of their environment. Computer scientists suggest artificial systems can at times draw better inferences than humans. For many …
Frames of Discovery and the Format of Cognitive Representation By Dimitri Coelho Mollo & Alfredo Vernazzani A central assumption in contemporary cognitive science and AI is that cognition involves internal representations. Quite like public, external representations, such as texts, pictures and maps, internal representations carry contents (i.e. they are about …
