David Chalmers helpfully pointed out that the first relevant use of “first-person data” appears to be due to Herbert Feigl (in “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’”, 1958). This brings up what seems to me a confusion in the current literature between first-person data as a kind of scientific data and …
The expression “first-person data” has become quite common in the consciousness studied literature, where it is used to refer to data about conscious experience, sometimes with the implication that these data are obtained only through introspection, and sometimes with the further implication that these are private data (as opposed to …
Here.
Next Spring, I’m teaching a course on mechanisms (mechanistic explanation) and functions (functional explanation). I’m considering some of the following sources: The Monist, 87.1 (2004). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 37.1 (2006). Allen, C., M. Bekoff, and G. Lauder, Eds. (1998). Nature’s Purposes: Analysis of Function and Design …
Traditionally, many philosophers like to attribute special status to at least some kinds of knowledge that we have of our minds. The purported reliability of introspection is often invoked by those who propose to construct a first-person science–a science based on private evidence delivered through introspection. Even Daniel Dennett, a naturalist …
In the recent thread, the issue of modularity was discussed. Anibal wrote the following: “My humble view is that the brain is a brilliant plastic and distributed machine using one single module to more than one cognitive function and viceversa.”This reminded me of some recent, interesting work along these lines …
A Brood Comb has collected an impressive list of philosophy online videos, many of which pertain to the philosophy of mind.
