Philosophy by Counterexamples

In comments to a recent post, Ken Aizawa raised the following question:      How is the development of a counterexample [to a philosophical theory] different than the       development of a falsifiable/falsified prediction of a scientific theory? I think this is a fascinating question that gets at the heart of contemporaty philosophical methodology, and I’d be curious to …

Communicative Intentions vs. Intentionality

A foreign student emailed me the following questions.(1) According to Jerry Fodor, does intentionality reduce to the reference of mental symbols plus the relation between the subject and the symbols?  (2) Under this theory, what happens to Gricean “communicative intentionality”? As far as I can tell the answer to (1) …

How Fruitful is This Debate?

In a recent post, I noticed that the debate over representationalism about consciousness is often conducted by discussing putative counterexamples, i.e., experiences that some philosophers find to be intuitively different even though according to some representationalist theories, they have the same representational content.  These examples are usually met by representationalists who …

Turing, von Neumann, and the Computer

It is possible to take two opposite lines on the origin of the modern computer.  (There should also be a place for Babbage in this story, but I will set that aside.)   One line says that Turing invented the computer in his 1936 mathematical paper.  After that, it was just …

Pluralistic Localism about Concepts

Dan Weiskopf, “Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content,” unpublished ms.In this interesting paper, Weiskopf defends an original theory of concepts, which may be called pluralistic localism.  The main components of the view are as follows:“(Localism) Concepts have constituent structure(Dual Content) Concepts have both referential and cognitive content(Indiv*) Concepts are individuated by …

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