D. Stoljar, Ignorance and Imagination: On the Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press (due out in May 2006).Why is it so hard to explain phenomenal consciousness in physical (i.e., naturalistic, scientific) terms? Why do many find it easy to imagine zombies and other putative …
Antti Revonsuo, Inner Presence: Consciousness as a Biological Phenomenon, MIT Press, 2006.If you are wondering who Revonsuo is, he is a neuroscientist from Finland. I haven’t read his new book but from the table of contents, it looks like a serious reflection on consciousness from a cognitive neuroscience and neurophysiology …
Perhaps the currently most popular and discussed objection to physicalism is the zombie conceivability argument, whose most famous proponent is David Chalmers. In a nutshell, the argument goes as follows: zombies are conceivable, if zombies are conceivable then zombies are possible, and if zombies are possible, then physicalism is false; …
