Last Saturday, in his Central APA commentary, Rick Grush raised this question and suggested it is the most fundamental question in the philosophy of mind. He also suggested that if you don’t understand this question and its importance you are missing something.I must be slow because I don’t think I …
Scott Sehon, Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation, MIT Press, 2005.Based on this review by Sarah Worley, Sehon’s book appears to be one of the latest installments in anti-naturalist philosophy of mind.From Kant to McDowell and beyond, there is a long tradition of philosophers who maintain that the mind as …
Bloomfield, P. (2005). “Let’s Be Realistic About Serious Metaphysics.” Synthese 144: 69-90.He argues that the only sense of possibility relevant to serious metaphysics (i.e., relevant to the metaphysics of the actual world) is how things may be given how the actual world is. (This notion of possibility-given-the-way-the-actual-world-is is supposed to …
Gillett, C. and B. Rives (2005). “The Non-Existence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis.” Nous 39(3): 483-504.They argue that there are no determinables, only determinates, on grounds of ontological parsimony. In their opinion, positing determinables on top of determinates leads to “double counting” of causal …
