With apologies for the delay, I’m glad to begin our next Mind & Language symposium, on Stephen Butterfill and Ian Apperly’s article “How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind”, with commentaries by Hannes Rakoczy (Göttingen), Shannon Spaulding (Oklahoma State), and Tad Zawidzki (George Washington University).
I’ve been thinking about the paper and movie linked at the previous post. Have a look at that if you haven’t, because it’s neat. Here’s what you might think about the movie. You might look at the clip on the left and the movie on the right, and think “Wow! …
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences is hosting a special issue on embodied cognition’s accounts of social cognition. Submissions are due March 1, 2011. For more information, see the journal’s website (here).
I’ve written
Something really weird happened today: A duplication of Shannon’s post on mirror neurons and simulation theory appeared out of the blue under my name (Gualtiero). I apologize for the inconvenience; I had nothing to do with it and hopefully it won’t happen again. (The tech support people didn’t have an …
Hi folks. I’m one of the new kids on the virtual block. Thanks to Gualtiero for giving me the opportunity to contribute here. I’m interested in the relation between mirror neurons and social cognition. Mirror neurons are neurons in our brains that fire for boththe first-person experience and the third-person …
Here are two things Dennett says about heterophenomenology: (1) Scientists should interpret a subject’s first-person reports as expressions of the subject’s beliefs (about their consciousness experience)(2) Scientists should treat people as incorrigible about what it’s like to be them. Since (2) seems to contradict Dennett’s often repeated claim that people …
