I have finished a paper (here) that uses some experimental methods to examine a question that has agitated for a few years the philosophy of concepts: Does the class of concepts fragment into several very heterogeneous kinds? Here is the abstract: Psychologists of concepts’ traditional assumption that there are many …
Here.
On a side note, I just found out that a recent paper of mine partially reduplicates an argument made by Gualtiero in one of his papers (with some differences in emphasis). Nice.At anyrate, I have been thinking about multiple realization. Now, whether these kinds of arguments refute any of the …
The standard pop story about connectionism in philosophical circles goes somewhat as follows: connectionism is an alternative to computationalism, or at least to classical computationalism, that emerged in the 1980s. This story is largely a myth due in part to the ambiguity of the term “connectionism”.“Connectionism” has come to mean several different …
Suppose one is allowed denumerably many letters in an alphabet and denumerably many instructions (i.e., denumerably many four-tuples of the “Q1 0 1 Q2” (quintuples would do as well) in a TM program. Then one can treat each of the standard numerals in decimal notation as a letter in …
One often finds computation described as having originated with Alan Turing and as symbol manipulation. Yet, Turing imposed certain sorts of finiteness conditions on computations, such as that a program must be finite in length. These finiteness conditions are not captured in the description of computation as symbol manipulation. So, …
I’m just back from Kirchberg am Wechsel where the annual Wittgenstein Symposium took place. This year’s edition was vastly inspiring for me – maybe because the good old Ludwig never really featured in plenary talks.
