By Manolo Martinez In my last post I was assuming familiarity with something not many people is familiar with. I apologise. Let me say a quick thing about the imperative content strategy to defend representationalism about pain. Before that, representationalism: this is the idea that the phenomenal character of experiences …
By Manolo Martinez [UPDATE] I have posted a quick summary of the imperative content strategy in dealing with affective phenomenology here. Hello everyone. This is my first post for Brains! So, yep: great to be here, etc. A quick caveat: I’m afraid this post makes a tl;dr response perfectly appropriate. …
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David Chalmers’s 1993 paper, “A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition,” contains his most systematic discussion of computation as a foundation for cognitive science. The paper has been posted online (https://consc.net/papers/computation.html), discussed, and cited during all these years. The paper will finally be published in a special issue of the …
In just a little less than two weeks, New York City will be home to the second annual Experimental Philosophy Workshop. This year’s workshop will be highlighting research in the experimental philosophy of consciousness, with presentations by Shaun Nichols, Edouard Machery and Kurt Gray and commentaries by Alvin Goldman, David …
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One thing that I find frustrating, as I’m sure many of us do, is the quality of attempts to bring the study of consciousness (and the mind/brain more generally) to those outside of academia. I don’t just mean oversimplifications (God brain area found!), but how much of what is said …
