Knowing That P Without Believing That P

For those interested, Eric Schwitzgebel and I have been exploring the relationship between knowledge ascriptions and belief ascriptions.  We just finished a draft on this topic, which can be found here. Abstract: The standard view in contemporary epistemology is that knowledge entails belief. Proponents of this claim rarely offer a …

Aizawa on Turing-Equivalent Computation and Cognitive Science

In a previous thread, Ken Aizawa suggests that I’m insufficiently pluralistic about computation in cognitive science and to substantiate his criticism he points to his forthcoming article “Computation in Cognitive Systems; It’s not al about Turing-Equivalent Computation” (available on his website). Having read Ken’s nice paper, I only have time …

Information Processing, Computation, and Medium Independence

In response to a previous thread, Jonathan Livengood asked some very good questions about, roughly, what should count as information processing and computation in physical systems.  Perhaps it will help to take a step back. In my early work on computation, I argued that, roughly, only physical processes that take strings of digits …

A Response to Machery’s Response

By Jim Virtel The latest issue of BBS includes a précis of Edouard Machery’s Doing Without Concepts —the book that boldly argues that the term “concept” should be eliminated from psychology.  The fourth tenet of Machery’s Heterogeneity Hypothesis (HH) proposes that prototypes, exemplars, and theories —three types of concept —are …

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