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In the following I look at two fronts on which you might battle Chalmers’ arguments against physicalism about consciousness. The first is from Polgar’s recent paper (recently discussed by Richard Brown) in which he briefly critique’s Chalmers’ implicit theory of reduction. The second is the more common strategy of attacking him for assuming he can conceive of zombies in the first place. I argue that the second strategy is better, though they are not mutually exclusive.
Cross-Posted @ Philosophy Sucks! While I was perusing the new entries over at PhilPapers yesterday I came across Tom Polger‘s forthcoming paper inPhilosophical Psychology Are Sensations Still Brain Processes? The paper is very interesting (disclaimer: I have a special interest in this stuff; see for instance The Identity Theory in 2-D) and I thought I would …
Dialogue will publish soon the symposium on Doing without Concepts with Tania Lombrozo’s, Pierre Poirier’s and our own Gualtiero’s papers. (Gualtiero’s paper was posted on this blog earlier and was followed by a lively exchange.) The three papers are really excellent and worth reading. My reply is
Some of you might be interested by Kim Sterelny’s essay on the evolution of humans and by the commentaries on his essay (C. Driscoll, P.S. Davies, mine, etc.). It’s a good summary of Kim’s views. The symposium is organized by C. Driscoll on the forum On the Human. Edouard
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This website was just brought to my attention. It is the Journal of Visualized Experiments (JoVE), an “online research journal employing visualization to increase reproducibility and transparency in biological sciences”. It’s interesting and potentially quite useful. Does anyone have any thoughts on it?