In a previous post, I asked whether creature consciousness might be ontologically more important, including as part of the ontological basis for phenomenal consciousness, than many philosophers seem to think. I was motivated in part by “Consciousness without a Cerebrain Cortex: A Challenge for Neuroscience and Medicine,” a forthcoming BBS target article …
The last issue of the New Yorker has a long profile of Paul and Patricia Churchland. This is a must-read for anyone who is not well acquainted with the history of the Churchlands. Unfortunately, the article gets some important aspects of the background history wrong. For instance, it suggests that …
Mmh… Probably not yet. (Link courtesy of Mike Ferreira.)
Over at Brainhammer, Pete Mandik set out the following problems for info-semantics: If it’s determinate specifications you are worried about, it’s worth keeping in mind that causal/informational stories haven’t been without their own problems. Regarding specificity, there are all sorts of problems concerning where in the causal chain to locate …
Last Friday, Stephen Stich gave a talk at UMSL. I was especially happy because I’m a big fan of Stich’s work.For those who may not know, Stich has been engaged for decades in a campaign against certain armchair methods in philosophy, such as certain forms of “conceptual analysis” based on …
Corey Maley raised some doubts on Brain Hammer, and I offered my reasons for a (qualified) positive answer. If anyone has any thoughts on this, I’d be interested in hearing them.
Following up on my suggestion of posting about sessions on the philosophy of neuroscience at the upcoming ISHPSSB, here is some:I will be involved in two sessions dealing with the History and Philosophy of Electrophysiology. Other panelists include: Bill Bechtel, Jim Bogen, Don Goodman, Ken Schaffner, Daniel Sirtes, and Marcel Weber.There …
