We are thrilled to announce that Jorge Ignacio Fuentes Muñoz will be joining us at Brains as an Associate Editor. Jorge is an assistant professor at Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, and will be overseeing content in philosophy of mind and neuroscience, as well as keeping us updated on philosophical …
Hi All, In the next weeks and months, we’ll be making some exciting new additions to the editorial team at Brains. Two new Associate Editors will be introduced this week! I want to take the chance to give a huge thanks to two of our recent Associate Editors who will …
Reply to Chirimuuta Mazviita Chirimuuta is sympathetic to my deflationary construal of scientists’ representational talk when they characterize their models, but she sees objectionable elements of eliminativism in my discussion of representation outside the domain of science. She says of me: “If she has to choose between the ontology of the manifest image, and that of the scientific image, it’s the manifest that …
Comment on Deflating Mental Representation by Frances Egan A “Left Sellarsian” Response to a “Right Sellarsian” Proposal “Now the idea that epistemic facts can be analysed without remainder—even ‘in principle’—into non-epistemic facts, whether phenomenal or behavioural, public or private, with no matter how lavish a sprinkling of subjunctives and hypotheticals is, I believe, a radical …
Reply to Mace and Roskies Caitlin Mace and Adina Roskies (hereafter, M&R) argue that the identification of vehicles in neuroscience depends intimately on the prior assignment of content, and so content cannot be relegated to an extra-theoretical gloss. Identifying neural vehicles is notoriously difficult and, they claim, subject to indeterminacy. To identify computational vehicles, experimenters look for neural signals whose activity appears …
Title: Vehicle realism, content pragmatism: Uneasy bedfellows Caitlin Mace and Adina L. Roskies Frances Egan’s (2025) “Deflating Mental Representation” poses an interesting challenge to both realists and fictionalists about mental representation. In the book she argues for a pragmatic view of representational content and realism about representational vehicles. The book as a whole is a deflationary take on the primary ways in …
Reply to Oron Shagrir Oron Shagrir argues that computation and content are more interconnected than my account allows. Computational individuation, he claims, is subject to indeterminacy, and at least in some cases the indeterminacy is resolved by appeal to content. If content is a gloss, as I argue, then according to Shagrir computational characterization is partly a gloss too. …
