Consider the following argument: 1. Eve’s believing that p is realized by having a token of p in her head. 2. Having a token of p in one’s head is realized by some detailed, neural state. So, 3. Eve’s believing that p is realized by some detailed neural state. …
A (nontechnical) review of recent work in neuroethics.
Is the mind in the head?As someone recently pointed out on this blog, there is a large stream of recent books defending the view that mental states, or processes, or systems, extend beyond the nervous system. It would be interesting to know how many people, or at least how many …
Benoit Hardy-Vallée has put online a page with many search engines and resources that some may find useful for their research. To see it, go to https://bhv.direct.to and click “research tools”.
Here.
As some of you may know, I am engaged in a long-term campaign against the view that concrete computations (computational states, computing mechanisms) are individuated, even in part, by their semantic properties. Of course, computations may be interpreted, i.e., assigned semantic content, but this is not part of their individuation. …
Culture Dish comments on a fascinating finding by Swiss researchers, published in Nature and reported by the National Geographic. “[A]s a result of focal electrical stimulation of the left temporoparietal junction,” … they induced “[t]he strange sensation that somebody is nearby when no one is actually present”.
