Here is an interesting session organized by David Anderson: FRIDAY, February 17, 3-6pm (at the Palmer House, Chicago) SESSION ON “Machine Consciousness” (Sponsored by the APA Committee on Computers and Philosophy) Chair: David Leech Anderson (Illinois State University) 3:00 Ned Block (New York University), “Can thinking about …
[cross-posted @ Philosophy Sucks!] In Ned Block’s recent paper, published in Trends In Cognitive Science, he has defended his argument that perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access from several recent objections (including from me). It is important that Block is defending overflow from cognitive access since he admits that perceptual consciousness does not overflow …
Cross-posted at Philosophy Sucks! So much has been going on in nyc that I have had trouble keeping up with it. However I have a bit of free time today and wanted to jot down a few notes about Sid Kouider’s recent presentation at the CUNY CogSci Colloquium. Sid was …
The head of the philosophy program at LaGuardia, John Chaffee, is the author of an introductory text book The Philosopher’s Way. The book is entering its fourth edition and John is updating the chapter on the self and consciousness. In particular he is updating the section on Paul Churchland’s eliminative materialism …
UPDATE 7/27/11 The paper is now available on Consciousness and Cognition’s website: The myth of phenomenological overflow —————– I have just finished my contribution to the Special Issue of Consciousness and Cognition that I am editing featuring descendants of papers from the second online consciousness conference and made the pre-print …
Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology Guest editors: Adrian J. T. Smith & Frédérique de Vignemont Call for Papers Deadline for submissions: 15th of August, 2011 Cognition is embodied. The body is represented. Is there genuinely a convergence of ideas here? Does the claim that representations of …
Perusing the new issue of Philosophical Studies that came out I came across Chad Kidd’s paper Phenomenal Consciousness with Infallible Self-Representation, which happens to be freely available on Phil Studies home page. The paper is interesting and aims to respond to the challenge raised by Josh Weisberg’s paper Same Old, Same Old: The …
