
We are pleased to have Jordi Fernández blogging this week on Memory: A Self-Referential Account, newly published by Oxford University Press. To view all of Jordi’s posts on a single page, please click here.
This week, I’m writing a series of posts on my new book Memory: A Self-Referential Account (Oxford University Press, 2019). The post today concerns the topic of chapter four, the phenomenology of memory and, in particular, two aspects of the temporal phenomenology of memory. Firstly, when we remember something, we …
This week, I’m writing a series of posts on my new book Memory: A Self-Referential Account (Oxford University Press, 2019). The post today concerns the content of memories; the topic of chapter three. I defend the view that memories are self-referential in that they represent a property of themselves. Specifically, …
This week I am writing a series of posts about my new book Memory: A Self-Referential Account (Oxford University Press, 2019). My first post, today, concerns the metaphysics of experiential, or episodic, memory. In chapter two, I address the question of what it takes for a subject’s mental state to …
We are pleased to have Jordi Fernández blogging this week on Memory: A Self-Referential Account, newly published by Oxford University Press. To view all of Jordi’s posts on a single page, please click here.
This week, I’m blogging about my new book, The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, September 2019). Over the past three days, I’ve discussed the epistemic role of consciousness in perception, cognition, and introspection. In this final post, I want to explain how I integrate these claims about the …
This week, I’m blogging about my new book, The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, September 2019). Today, I’ll discuss the epistemic role of consciousness in introspection. What is introspection? Literally, ‘introspection’ means ‘looking within’. But the term is often used as a placeholder for the distinctively first-personal way …
This week, I’m blogging about my new book, The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, September 2019). Today, I’ll discuss the epistemic role of consciousness in cognition. Could there be a cognitive zombie – that is, an unconscious creature with the capacity for cognition? As I use the term, …