This week, I’m writing a series of posts on my new book Memory: A Self-Referential Account (Oxford University Press, 2019). The post today concerns the topic of chapter seven, the epistemically generative character of memory. There is a debate on whether memory generates justification for beliefs about the past, or …
This week, I’m writing a series of posts on my new book Memory: A Self-Referential Account (Oxford University Press, 2019). The post today concerns the topic of chapter five, the phenomenology of memory and, in particular, the feeling of a memory as being one’s own (a ‘feeling of mineness’ in …
This week, I’m writing a series of posts on my new book Memory: A Self-Referential Account (Oxford University Press, 2019). The post today concerns the topic of chapter four, the phenomenology of memory and, in particular, two aspects of the temporal phenomenology of memory. Firstly, when we remember something, we …
This week, I’m writing a series of posts on my new book Memory: A Self-Referential Account (Oxford University Press, 2019). The post today concerns the content of memories; the topic of chapter three. I defend the view that memories are self-referential in that they represent a property of themselves. Specifically, …
This week I am writing a series of posts about my new book Memory: A Self-Referential Account (Oxford University Press, 2019). My first post, today, concerns the metaphysics of experiential, or episodic, memory. In chapter two, I address the question of what it takes for a subject’s mental state to …
The Centre for Philosophy of Memory at the Université Grenoble Alpes is pleased to invite submissions for an essay prize on the theme of philosophy of memory. The winning essay will be published in the Review of Philosophy and Psychology. The winner will be awarded a budget of up to 3000 …
Theories of sensory imagination often make a distinction between first-personal or ‘subjective’ imagery, in which one views an imagined scene from-the-inside, and third-personal or ‘objective’ imagery, in which one sees oneself from-the-outside.[1] For example, if you are imagining swimming you may feel the cold and pull of the water, and …
