Memory and the Self: Style and Content

Style and Content In yesterday’s post, style and content were represented as two separable elements. On the one hand, there is the content of memory. And on the other there is a style that exists – in the form of embodied and affective Rilkean memories – when content has been …

Memory and the Self: Rilkean Memory

Rilkean Memory The exploration of the role of the act of remembering in constructing – or, as I prefer, sculpting – the content of episodic memory begins with the identification of a novel form of remembering that I call Rilkean memory, after the Bohemian poet Rainer Maria Rilke, who provided …

Memory and the Self: The Presence of the Self in Memory

The Presence of the Self in Memory In Memory and the Self, I operated with a claim that was, in hindsight, perhaps made a little too blithely. The essence of episodic memory, I argued, is that it presents an episode (a certain kind of state-of-affairs) in a specific way. You …

Memory and the Self: Phenomenology, Science and Autobiography

Thanks to John Schwenkler for the invitation to guest-blog this week about my new book, Memory and the Self: Phenomenology, Science and Autobiography (Oxford University Press NY, 2016). *** Memory and the Autobiographical Self: The Problem Intuitively, it is not unreasonable to suppose that our episodic memories play a significant …

Applications are open for the 2017 Summer Seminars in Neuroscience and Philosophy

Calling all curious neuroscientists and philosophers! Collaborate in the summer seminars for neuroscience and philosophy, a three year program sponsored by the John Templeton Foundation and Duke University. Our goal is to advance knowledge at the intersection of these fields. Together we can apply cutting-edge scientific research to the big questions on …

The Unexplained Intellect: The Mind’s Dynamic Foundations

One theme of this week’s posts has been the claim that dynamic entities are among the most metaphysically basic of the things in the mental domain.  I’ve made only the vaguest gestures towards saying what I mean by this (in response to Gualtiero’s earlier comment). By dynamic entities, I mean …

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