3. The Naturalistic Case for Free Will: Indeterminism as an Emergent Phenomenon

How could we have alternative possibilities if the world was physically deterministic? I argue that physical determinism does not rule out indeterminism at the level of agency. The distinction between determinism and indeterminism is level-specific.

Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds: The Overall Argument

Does responsibility require the possibility to have done otherwise? Does knowledge require safety? Can causation be reduced to some form of counterfactual dependency? Could a material duplicate fail to be a psychological duplicate? To answer these and similar questions, one must gain knowledge about metaphysical possibilities and necessities. One must …

How could we rationally suppose that we lack free will?

[The following is a guest post by Bob Lockie. — JS] He who says that all things happen of necessity can hardly find fault with one who denies that all happens by necessity; for on his own theory this very argument is voiced by necessity (Epicurus 1964: XL). Epicurus’s famous …

Philosophical Foundations of Neurolaw

Another book that may be of interest to The Brains Blog community is my Philosophical Foundations of Neurolaw, which is coming out next month. A major aim of the book is to provide an alternative to Michael Pardo and Dennis Patterson’s treatment of issues in the philosophy of mind and …

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