Symposium on Isham et al.: “Deliberation period during easy and difficult decisions: Re-examining Libet’s ‘veto’ window in a more ecologically valid framework”

I am delighted to announce the second in our series of symposia on articles from Neuroscience of Consciousness.  We have two types of symposia.  For primarily theoretical articles, such as in last week’s post, we will have several commentators from a variety of theoretical perspectives.  For novel empirical research, we …

CFP: Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Agency

The Philosophy Graduate Student Association of Florida State University is now accepting submissions for their Sixth Annual Graduate Conference on Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Agency. The conference will take place on October 6th and 7th, 2017. Keynote speakers will be: David Shoemaker, Professor of Philosophy, Tulane University Michael McKenna, …

Neuroethics Symposium: Special Issue on The Biology of Desire by Marc Lewis

It is my pleasure to introduce the latest in our series of symposia on papers from the journal Neuroethics. The focus of the current symposium is a forthcoming special issue of Neuroethics on Marc Lewis‘s book The Biology of Desire: Why Addiction Is Not a Disease (PublicAffairs, 2016). In his book, Lewis challenges the …

Applications are open for the 2017 Summer Seminars in Neuroscience and Philosophy

Calling all curious neuroscientists and philosophers! Collaborate in the summer seminars for neuroscience and philosophy, a three year program sponsored by the John Templeton Foundation and Duke University. Our goal is to advance knowledge at the intersection of these fields. Together we can apply cutting-edge scientific research to the big questions on …

What are we responsible for?

Josh Glasgow, Sonoma State University From time to time, I feel alienated from my actions and thoughts.  I wonder why I did or said something that I did not really want to do or say.  I recoil at a rogue thought that drifts through my mind. And of course, many …

Belief, willpower, and implicit bias

Keith Frankish Visiting Research Fellow, The Open University www.keithfrankish.com Jo sincerely affirms that black people are no less trustworthy than white people. Yet despite this, she consistently behaves in ways that reflect the assumption that black people are less trustworthy — subtly adjusting her behaviour towards black people across a …

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