How could we have alternative possibilities if the world was physically deterministic? I argue that physical determinism does not rule out indeterminism at the level of agency. The distinction between determinism and indeterminism is level-specific.
Realism about free will is warranted, because the picture of humans as choice-making agents is explanatorily indispensable in the human and social sciences.
This series of posts discusses some key ideas from Why Free Will is Real (Harvard University Press, 2019) by Christian List.
The next Neural Mechanisms webinar is Friday (22nd) 8-10 Greenwich Mean Time: Karen YAN (National Yang-Ming University) presents “Evaluating the Success of Causal Investigative Strategies in Neurophysiology”. Find out about the paper and how to join the webinar in this post.
Jaegwon Kim’s discussions of the problem of mental causation have been enormously influential, so it should come as no surprise that some critics have tried to apply his reasoning to the hylomorphic solution discussed in Part 1.
The problem of mental causation is a central problem in the metaphysics of mind, but hylomorphism implies an elegant solution to it.
You may (or may not) have noticed that Pete Mandik and Richard Brown (me) have started a podcast, called SpaceTimeMind, where we talk about tax law updates for 2014, uh, I mean, er, we talk about space and time and mind! The first episode is up now (and has been …
I just culled together a bunch of putative examples of downward causation, some from advocates, some from detractors. Particularly interesting and promising is the article by Robert Bishop, Downward causation in fluid convection, and Bechtel/Craver’s article Top-down causation without top-down causes, for which brief quotes will not do justice. (Note …