We’re excited to share the videos from the Neural Mechanisms 2018 Web Conference entitled “New Challenges in Philosophy of Neuroscience“. The videos can be found at the Neural Mechanisms YouTube channel or in the program below—each paper title links to its YouTube video. Thanks to Marco Viola and Fabrizio Calzavarini for organizing the …
Submissions for the Cincinnati meeting should be sent by November 1!
I recently developed a novel paradox involving a variety of representational states and activities, and I am wondering if readers might have any thoughts about my ideas here. To illustrate the paradox, I first prove that there are certain contingently true propositions that no one can occurrently believe. Then, I …
Split-brain subjects talk about themselves using the first-person, singular, pronoun. Of course, by hypothesis, it’s always just one of two split-brain thinkers doing the talking. (In some subjects, R seems to have learned to speak a bit, but never in whole sentences.) Still, this thinker and speaker—L—consistently uses the first-person …
In yesterday’s post I argued that a split-brain subject is not unitary qua thinker but is actually composed of two thinkers. The book also defends two further, related duality claims: that R and L are distinct subjects of experience and that they are distinct intentional agents. To many people, however, …
I’m delighted to announce that registration is now open for the Depiction, Pictorial Experience, and Vision Science conference at the University of Glasgow’s Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience on 15-17 November 2018. Speakers: Solveig Aasen, University of Oslo John Kulvicki, Dartmouth College Clare Mac Cumhaill, University of Geneva Fiona Macpherson, University of Glasgow Bence Nanay, University of …
The book argues for three duality claims: one concerning split-brain consciousness, one concerning split-brain intentional agency, and one concerning split-brain psychology generally. Each of the duality claims amounts to a claim about personal identity. If there are two centers or streams of conscious there must be two subjects of conscious …
