
We are grateful to Edouard Machery for blogging this week on Philosophy Within its Proper Bounds (Oxford, 2017). To view all his posts on a single page, please click here. And watch this space for updates on other upcoming events at Brains.
In the previous post I presented the main arguments against the method of cases developed in Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds. Various objections can be raised against this argument, some of which have already been put in print. Chapter 5 addresses 8 objections: I defend the experimental quality of the research …
CALL FOR PAPERS for a topical issue of Open Philosophy “Computer Modeling in Philosophy” Open Philosophy (https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/opphil) invites submissions for the topical issue “Computer Modeling in Philosophy,” edited by Patrick Grim (Stony Brook/University of Michigan). Computational modeling opens new prospects for philosophical exploration and argument. The role played by logic …
In the previous post, I argued for a minimalist characterization of the method of cases, which I share with some of the most well-known critics of experimental philosophy. In this post, I want to present the two arguments against the method of cases, developed in Chapter 3 and 4 of …
In the previous post, I introduced the method of cases: To find out whether modal claims are true, philosophers describe actual and possible situations and assess what facts hold in these situations. For instance, following Gettier’s classic paper, to determine whether, necessarily, someone knows that pif and only if she …
Does responsibility require the possibility to have done otherwise? Does knowledge require safety? Can causation be reduced to some form of counterfactual dependency? Could a material duplicate fail to be a psychological duplicate? To answer these and similar questions, one must gain knowledge about metaphysical possibilities and necessities. One must …

We are grateful to Edouard Machery for blogging this week on Philosophy Within its Proper Bounds (Oxford, 2017). To view all his posts on a single page, please click here. And watch this space for updates on other upcoming events at Brains.
In my final post I consider whether all our visual cues to scale function at the level of cognition rather than vision, and the kind of theory that ‘vision without scale’ would imply. 1. Physiological Cues There are two aspects to 3D vision: shape and scale. So far we have …