How could we rationally suppose that we lack free will?

[The following is a guest post by Bob Lockie. — JS] He who says that all things happen of necessity can hardly find fault with one who denies that all happens by necessity; for on his own theory this very argument is voiced by necessity (Epicurus 1964: XL). Epicurus’s famous …

CFP: Australasian Society for Philosophy and Psychology

Australasian Society for Philosophy and Psychology Call For Symposia And Papers 1st Annual Meeting December 5-7, 2018 Sydney, Australia The Australasian Society for Philosophy and Psychology invites proposals for symposia and papers  for its first annual meeting, to be held in Sydney, 5-7 December 2018. Submissions are open to anyone with …

CFP: Essays in Philosophy issue on “The Philosophy of Memory”

Call for Papers The Philosophy of Memory Essays in Philosophy Volume 19, Number 2 Issue Date: July 2018 Submission Deadline: March 1, 2018 Issue Editors: Ian O’Loughlin (Pacific University) and Sarah Robins (University of Kansas) Memory is a fundamental element of human—and more broadly, animal—intelligence and experience. Given memory’s importance, …

Vision Science Summer School for Undergraduates at York: All Expenses Paid

The Centre for Vision Research (CVR) at York University in Toronto, Canada offers a one-week, all-expenses-paid undergraduate summer school on vision science.  This year’s program will be held June 4-8, 2018. This year’s summer school is being held in cooperation with the Vision: Science to Applications (VISTA) initiative that will …

Evolving Enactivism: The Natural Origins of Content

In our previous posts, we have so far focused on: (1) clarifying our understanding of Ur-intentionality – REC’s positive proposal for understanding the thesis that basic cognition lacks content; (2) reviewing the problems faced by classic teleosemantic theories that motivate adopting REC’s proposal; and (3) detailing some of the theoretical …

Evolving Enactivism: Neurodynamics sans content

In a direct challenge to radical, anti-representational proposals about how to conceive of cognition, Aizawa (2015) asks “If the brain does not contribute information processing or symbol manipulation or the transformation of representations … then what does it do?” (2015, 761–762). Given that REC embraces precisely such radicalisms, what alternative …

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